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Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dept. of Family, etc./ a recent case involving 
an unsuccessful attempt by a white couple to adopt a child of "mixed racial 
ancestry," is the starting point of this article. In Drummond, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, en bane, rejected constitutional attacks on the child welfare agency's 
decision denying a white couple's request to adopt a child of "mixed racial 
ancestry." The court held that race may constitutionally be used as a factor, 
perhaps as the "decisive factor," in determining who should be allowed 
to adopt. 2 It also held that the particular child involved in the litigation, 
who had been in the foster care of the white couple for nearly two years, 
had no constitutional "right to a stable environment."3 In effect the court 
found no authority for ordering the state officials to recognize the particular 
relationship between the foster parents, in this case a white couple, and 
the child of mixed racial ancestry as a constitutionally protected child-parent 
relationship. 4 
Part I of this article demonstrates that Drummond is not an isolated case. 
Rather the decisionmaking in Drummond illustrates how the present legal 
system,5 including constitutional doctrine, encourages the agency to ap-
proach the adoption request in precisely the manner it did. It is the agen-
cy's and court's approach to child placement decisionmaking, not their par-
ticular handling of the "race" issue, that makes Drummond of enduring 
significance. 6 
Part II urges agencies and courts to reject the Drummond analysis as a 
1. 408 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 547 F.2d 835, aff'd on rehearing en ban>, 563 
F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), mt. denied, 43 7 U.S. 910 (1978). 
2. "But can race be taken into account, perhaps decisively if it is the factor which tips 
the balance between two potential families, where it is not used automatically? We conclude, 
as did another court which grappled with the problem, that 'the difficulties inherent in inter-
racial adoption' justify the consideration of 'race as a relevant factor in adoption ... .' Compos 
v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972)." 563 F.2d at 1205. 
3. 563 F.2d at 1209. 
4. Id. at 1209. 
5. Professor E. F. Roberts' description of a "legal system," although developed in a differ-
ent context, might profitably be used in this discussion of child placement. He states: 
... that by 'legal system' I envisage three complementary phenomena: the law crowd, 
the law matrix, and the yearning for justice. By the law crowd I mean judges, lawyers, 
law professors, law review men, legislators, and lobbyists. The sum of the 
work-oriented activities of these people--that is, the total of their behavioral pat-
terns--constitutes the physical dimensions of the legal system. The law matrix consists 
of the principles, rules, and canons believed by non-participants and by 'C' students to 
constitute 'law.' Justice, at least in our society, is the notion that the law crowd ap-
plying the law matrix to a dispute or problem ought to come up with a 'just decision,' 
which really means that the non-participants feel that in the long run the 'good guys' 
ought to triumph over the 'bad guys.' 
Roberts, Preliminary NoteJ Toward A Study of ]udida/ Notke, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 210, 211 
(1967). 
6. See text accompanying notes 102-144 infra. 
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method for resolving fundamental conflicts within the adoption process. On 
its face, Drummond's balancing approach to racial considerations in adoption 
overplays the significance of "race" to the detriment of the child's interest 
in continuing his relationship to his foster parents. Implicitly, the Drum-
mond court's analysis allows the state agency to act as substitute parent to 
the child under the guise of furthering his "best interests." Moreover, the 
court's opinion ignores the significance of foster care decisionmaking in the 
child's life and the child's chances of being adopted by another family. 
Part III offers an alternative method for evaluating child placement de-
cisions in adoption cases. This method requires courts to see the connection 
between foster care and adoption. To do so, a court must interpret the rele-
vance of the recent United States Supreme Court precedents regarding 
family life. Drummond misinterpreted the only Supreme Court case dealing 
with the constitutional perimeters of foster care decisionmaking. 7 More im-
portantly, neither the litigants nor the court in Drummond discussed the rel-
evance of the Supreme Court's recent decision limiting the state's power to 
define "family."8 This article proposes a constitutional theory based on an 
interpretation of these recent cases that protects the rights of the child 
in the adoption process. The major implication of the proposed theory is 
that constitutional analysis should consider the interests of the adults, the 
child, and the state as three distinct and potentially conflicting interests or 
"rights."9 
Part IV acknowledges that acceptance of the proposed constitutional 
theory would require us to abandon a sacred cow of present day child 
placement decisionmaking: the presumption that the state is competent to 
act as parent to children. This presumption has confused child placement 
decisionmaking and could be eliminated if courts and legislatures used the 
proposed theory as a guideline for reforming present child placement laws. 
In adopting a perspective that focuses on the needs of the child, courts and 
legislatures should refrain from concentrating on the so called "best inter-
ests" of the child in the long run. Instead the goal of law should be to seek 
to avoid greater immediate harm to a child who is already in crisis because 
of the intervention of law into his or her life. With this short range goal in 
mind, the problem of transracial adoption and its proposed solutions ap-
pear in a new light. In particular, the attempts by agencies and courts to 
match black children with black adoptive parents seem misguided. 
7. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 
(1977). 
8. Moore v. Ciry of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
9. See Burt, Developing Constitutional RightJ Of, In, And For Children, 39 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 118 (Summer 1975). 
4 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11: 1 
I. THE LIFE OF A FOSTER CHILD 
A. The Facts of Drummond 
The child involved in the litigation in Drummond, Timmy, was born to 
a white mother on November 17, 197 3. Since the mother was unmarried, 
state law assigned the child to her, 10 and without any action on her part, 
Timmy was labelled "an illegitimate child." 11 
Legal intervention into Timmy's life took a more active and complex 
form one month after his birth. The state agency removed Timmy from 
the home of his biological mother because of her "unfitness."12 This initial 
removal set in motion a number of legal and social consequences for 
Timmy. 13 The most significant of these consequences is that legal custody 
remained in Timmy's mother, while the legal right to care for Timmy was 
lodged in the agency. 14 This legal right to Timmy's actual daily care was 
delegated immediately to the Drummonds who were assigned to be his fos-
ter care parents. 15 That Mrs. Drummond was 50 years old and Mr. Drum-
10. "The mother of an illegitimate child shall be entitled to the possession of the child, 
unless the father shall legitimate him as before provided. Being the only recognized parent, 
she may exercise all the paternal power." GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1973). 
11. "An illegitimate child, or bastard, is a child born out of wedlock, and whose parents 
do not subsequently intermarry, or a child the issue of adulterous intercourse of the wife dur-
ing wedlock, or a child who is not legitimate within the meaning of section 74-101." GA. 
CODE ANN. § 74-201 (1973). 
Although the purposes of this "illegitimate" label in the modern context are unclear, there 
is no doubt that the initial assignment of Timmy to his biological mother and the definition of 
his legal status are products of conscious lawmaking. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 
762 (1977). See also, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-204 & 74-205, and, Brinkley v. Dixie Consr. Co., 
205 Ga. 415, 54 S.E.2d 267 (1949) (for a construction of Georgia's statutory prohibition 
against judicial discrimination on the basis of illegitimate birth). 
12. 547 F.2d 835 at 837. "Unfitness" is nor a statutory basis for removal in Georgia. "A 
parent may lose the right to custody only if one of the conditions specified in Code§§ 74-108, 
74-109, and 74-110 is found to exist, or, in exceptional cases, if the parent is found to be un-
fit." Bowman v. Bowman, 234 Ga. 348, 349, 216 S.E.2d 103, 104 (1975). The record does 
nor indicate what particular incident brought Timmy to the agency's attention. 
13. From this point on, law assumed a _proactive rather than reactive role. Professor 
Donald). Black has described the distinction between "proactive" and "reactive" functioning in 
the following terms: 
A case can enter a legal system from two possible directions. A citizen may set the le-
gal process in motion by bringing a complaint; or the state may initiate a complaint 
upon irs own authority, with no participation of a citizen complainant. In the first se-
quence a legal agency reacts to a citizen, so we refer to it as a reactive mobilization 
process. In the second sequence, where a legal official acts with no prompting from a 
citizen we may speak of a proactive mobilization process. 
Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2). LEGAL STUD. 125, 128 (1973). 
14. See generally, Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 226, 240-245, (Summer 1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Mnookin I]. 
15. 547 F.2d at 837. 
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mond was 38 years old was of little significance since foster parents are usu-
ally somewhat older than adoptive or biological parents. 
There is no indication that race played any part in the placement with 
the Drummonds. 16 Timmy's appearance at one month was such that adults 
in a racially conscious city such as Atlanta did not notice his "mixed racial 
ancestry." 17 The agency officials assumed Timmy was white. At this stage 
the agency officials were simply trying to find a place for Timmy, and the 
Drummonds were available. 
From the agency's perspective, very little happened during the first 
year of Timmy's life other than an occasional home visit by a caseworker 
and payments to the Drummonds. 1 R But from the Drummonds' perspective, 
something very dramatic must have happened. By the time Timmy was a 
year old, the Drummonds, a childless couple, had communicated to their 
current foster care caseworker their desire to adopt Timmy. This case-
worker brought the Drummonds' adoption request to the attention of her 
supervisor, at a "staffing"19 or conference of agency personnel. From this 
16. The Drummonds never signed a foster care ageement in which foster parents prom-
ise not to attempt to adopt the child and to surrender the child upon demand. 563 F.2d at 
1203. No one involved in the litigation thought that this deviation from standard practice was 
significant. 
The lack of a standard foster care contract does have some implications for understanding 
the subsequent events. We could assume the Drummonds avoided signing the agreement for 
benevolent reasons. In contrast to some of their fellow foster parents, who might accept chil-
dren in their homes to obtain the additional economic resources, the Drummonds might have 
become foster parents because they wanted to meet the needs of a parentless child. As a result 
the legal formality of fee, terms, conditions, and options to modify the contract were of little 
importance to the Drummonds. Under this assumption, we would view their subsequent ex-
pression of a desire to adopt Timmy as a manifestation of the growth of parental feelings gen-
erated by Timmy's presence. Since the Drummonds had nor signed the standard foster care 
contract, we could view the subsequent loss of Timmy through litigation as a grave deprivation 
of "liberty" or "property" without adequate notice. Portions of the records support this as-
sumption of benevolence and the accompanying line of reasoning. 
On the other hand, we might assume the Drummonds set out initially to subvert and ma-
nipulate the foster care system to meet their own goal-adoption. The Drummonds had been 
foster parents to another foster child before Timmy so it can be assumed they knew the 
standard foster care practices and policies. By not signing the standard foster care agreement, 
the Drummonds may have been planning to attempt adoption in contravention of several ~tate 
welfare policies, since the ages of the Drummonds at the time of the staffing, 51 and 39, prob-
ably made them ineligible for adoption of an infant or young child. Under this assumption, the 
Drummonds were using the foster care system to openly achieve what would otherwise have 
been a "black market" adoption, and the result of the litigation in Drummond would be viewed 
as preventing some adults, otherwise unsuited to be adoptive parents, from manipulating the 
adoption process. 
Neither assumption changes the analysis offered in this article. 
17. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6, Drummond v. Fulton Cry. Dept. of Family, etc., 
in the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 76-180 (1977). 
18. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-423 (1973). 547 F.2d at 837. 
19. 547 F.2d at 837. None of the people attending the staffing in late 1974 had ever 
seen Timmy or the Drummonds. 
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point on, late in 1974, race would be considered by the agency when mak-
ing decisions about Timmy's future. 
At the staffing, Ms. Grape, the foster care supervisor, indicated that 
the Drummonds' adoption of Timmy was not a "good plan" because of 
the racial differences. 20 After a meeting between Ms. Grape and the 
Drummonds in March, 1975, at which these racial differences were dis-
cussed,21 Ms. Grape informed the Drummonds by letter that they would 
not be allowed to adopt Timmy. Despite this letter, towards the end of the 
summer, the Drummonds made new efforts to adopt Timmy. 22 After sub-
mission of their request, the agency took steps to terminate all the parental 
rights of Timmy's biological parents. 23 The renewed request of the 
Drummonds was formally considered in November, 1975 by the agency 
staff. Although an adoption caseworker had recommended that the 
Drummonds be allowed to adopt Timmy, 24 another staffing, consisting of 
nineteen persons, denied the request just before Timmy's second birth-
day. 25 The Drummonds were told by an agency official that it was still the 
agency's position that Timmy would be better off being adopted by a black 
family. 26 
In January, 1976, the Drummonds filed a complaint against the Fulton 
County Department of Family & Children's Service in the federal district 
court. 2 7 In their federal lawsuit they sought three remedies: a preliminary 
injunction preventing the agency from removing Timmy from their home; 
an order appointing a guardian for Timmy to represent his interests; and 
finally, an adjudication that the agency's denial of their request for adoption 
was unconstitutional because of the impermissible use of race in that deci-
sion. 28 Nine days after the filing of the complaint, the district court dis-
missed the complaint, and dissolved the preliminary restraining order it had 
entered, on the ground that the agency's action had been constitutionaJ.29 
At the same time the Drummonds filed a lawsuit in the state trial court 
seeking the same relief plus an additional remedy-an order compelling the 
20. Id. at 838. 
21. Id. at 839. See, e.g., Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So.2d 76 (La. App. 1956), (a 
court"s struggle with the racial designation of a child with a white and unknown father). 
22. Id. at 841. 
23. Id. at 845. 
24. Id. at 846. 
25. Ms. Payne had stated in her report that "This certainly is too risky a situation for any 
one person to make the decision alone." Id. at 846. 
26. Id. 
27. Drummond v. Fulton Cry. Dept. of Family and Children's Services, 408 F. Supp. 
382 (N.D. Ga. 1976). 
28. Although not reported in the District Court's opinion, this request is adverted to in 
Petitioner's Brief for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Drummond v. Fulton Cry. Dept. of Family, etc., 
In the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 77-1381 (1977). 
29. 408 F. Supp. at 383. 
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agency to consent to Timmy's adoption by the Drummonds.30 The state 
court also dismissed the complaint, largely on the ground that the Drum-
monds lacked standing to challenge the agency's decision. 31 
While the Drummonds appealed both dismissals, Timmy was removed 
by the agency from their home in May, 1976. Timmy's actual placement 
after he left the Drummonds is not known. He was apparently placed in the 
home of a couple of "mixed racial ancestry," for the purpose of adoption. 32 
This placement seemed to be unsuccessful. Timmy was later placed in his 
third foster home for the purpose of adoption. This family was described as 
"a young . . . . professional, mixed race couple who will adopt him if 
permitted by the courts."33 
As for the Drummonds' appeal, the state supreme court upheld the 
state trial court dismissal in September, 1976.34 A panel of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal in February, 1977. 35 
The appeals court instructed the trial judge to order the agency to hold a 
hearing where both Timmy and the Drummonds could receive constitution-
ally adequate opportunity to be heard on Timmy's adoption. 36 To insure 
that Timmy's rights were adequately represented the appeals court felt it 
necessary to appoint an attorney to represent Timmy. The court however 
denied the motions of the lawyer it had appointed to represent Timmy to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus and to hold the agency officials in contempt 
for not allowing him to have access to Timmy. 37 
Before the district court received the mandate of the court of appeals 
panel, the full court of appeals voted to hear the case en bane. 38 In N ovem-
ber, 1977 the court of appeals reversed the initial decision of the panel. 39 
Both the Drummonds' and Timmy's lawyers filed petitions for certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court. In June, 1978, both petitions were 
denied. 40 
While the litigation concerning Timmy has ended, at least, for the pres-
30. Drummond eta!. v. Fulton Cty. Dept. of Family, etc., 237 Ga. 449, 228 S.E.2d 839, 
841 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 905 (1977), reb. denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). 
31. 23 7 Ga. at 450, 228 S.E.2d at 842. 
32. Conversation with Timmy's counsel, Alan R. Turem, who stated that this fact was as-
serted by counsel for Respondent at oral argument before the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. 
33. Respondent's Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Drummond v. Fulton 
Cty. Dept. of Family, etc., In the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 77-1381 (1977). It 
is an open question whether, had the Drummonds not sought to adopt Timmy, the agency 
would have initiated such a placement. 
34. 23 7 Ga. 449, 228 S.E.2d 839 (1976). 
35. 547 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1977). 
36. Id. at 847. 
37. Id. at 857. 
38. Jd. at 861. 
39. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977). 
40. 46 U.S.L.W. 3 777 (1978). 
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ent,41 it is worth recalling what we know, and do not know about his case. 
First, we do not know, nor will we ever know Timmy's particular fate. 
Whether he was adopted, and if so by whom, are questions that the present 
legal system does not make a matter of record, even after two and a half 
years of protracted litigation. Whether Timmy will enter the mass of 
"unadoptable" and "older" minority children in foster care is also un-
known.42 We do know, however, that Timmy has spent nearly the entirety 
of his five years in limbo, as the law has sought to define or untangle his re-
lationship to various adults. This legal limbo is a function of the contempo-
rary analysis of child placement. We also know that his entanglement with 
legal authority began long before the issue of his adoption was brought to 
the attention of the courts. And finally, we know that his fate was resolved 
by courts without the lawyer appointed to represent him ever having access 
to him or agency materials about him. 43 
B. The Legal Context of Agency Actions in Drummond 
Judges and child welfare officials use various concepts to structure their 
decisions that affect a child's adoption. While the origins of these concepts 
are quite diverse, some of these concepts are inherent in the existing legal 
analysis of child placement decisions. Drummond itself illustrates three of 
these concepts. These concepts are that the interests of the biological par-
ents are constitutionally protected and preferred; that the adult in the 
parent-child relationship that is nonbiological has no interest in the child of 
constitutional significance; and finally that it is appropriate for a court to 
use the substitute judgment theory when making legal decisions involving 
child care and adoption. 
1. The Parental Rights of Biological Parents are 
Constitutionally Protected. 
The statutory scheme establishing foster care is premised on the propo-
sition that biological parents have rights in their children. 44 These "rights" 
41. Although the Fulton County Dept. of Family and Children's Services had stated that 
Timmy had been placed with a potential adoptive family, supra note 33, there was evidence 
that at least one such placement had already failed, supra note 32. Absent a permanent place-
ment, there may well be further litigation over Timmy's custody. It is also hard to assess the 
long-term effects of the disruptions of Timmy's family relationships within his first five years. 
It is possible that this disruption will lead to further contact between Timmy and the legal sys-
tem; see, GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, & SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
32-34 (1973) and, Burt, supra note 9, at 270-272. 
42. See note 41 supra and Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. 
EDUC. REV. 599, 610-13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mnookin II}. 
43. Timmy's counsel's motion that the court hold the defendants in contempt for failure 
to make the child available to him was denied. 547 F.2d at 857. See, also, text, infra, accompa-
nying note 75. 
44. 237 Ga. at 455, n.4, 228 S.E.2d at 845, n.4. 
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reflect a postulate of current constitutional doctrine that biological parents 
have "fundamental rights" in their offspring. 45 One result of this ideology 
of parental rights was that Timmy's stay in foster care was thought of as 
temporary custodial care pending his return to his biological parents. Or 
put another way, the constitutional rights of biological parents are so para-
mount in foster care decisionmaking that neither judges nor agency officials 
were concerned with the relationship formed between Timmy and his foster 
parents and the "rights" of Timmy affected by their decisions. 
Another consequence of this property-like notion of parental rights in 
children was that Timmy's mother was entitled to a formal court hearing 
before her legal status as his parent could be eliminated. 46 The hearing was 
required by constitutional doctrine even though there is no indication in 
the Drummond record that she had had any contact with Timmy for nearly 
two years. Had Timmy's biological father suddenly appeared, some com-
mentators interpret constitutional doctrine as granting him a right to a 
hearing47 and a greater claim to custody of Timmy than any other person 
other than his biological mother. 48 Thus, in Drummond, the agency officials 
informed the Drummonds that "termination" of Timmy's mother's parental 
rights was a prerequisite to any consideration of his adoption. 49 
At the very least the perception that Timmy's biological parents' inter-
ests are constitutionally protected encouraged the agency to act deliberately 
and slowly vis-a-vis termination of those interests. From the agency's per-
spective, a temporary foster care system could be said to be a necessary de-
vice for preserving the constitutional sanctity of the biological family. 5° 
2. Foster Parents Have no Constitutionally Protected Parental Rights. 
The child welfare agency's formal approach to terminating Timmy's bi-
ological mother's interest stands in stark contrast to their informal approach 
to the requests of his foster parents, the Drummonds. The decisions regard-
ing the Drummonds' adoption of Timmy were made at a staffing, the au-
thority of which is undefined and at which the Drummonds were not pres-
ent. The explanation for this state of affairs is simple: the Drummonds were 
45. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 209-11 infra. 
46. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
47. See Schafrick, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental 
Rights, 7 FAM. L.Q. 75, 87 (1973). See also, GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3202(b) "Proceeding for 
Termination of Parental Rights"; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
48. See Quilloin v. Walcott, supra note 47. 
49. 547 F.2d at 842. 
50. C/ Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
856-7 (Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment), ("[F]oster care is intended only as a tem-
porary way station until a child can be returned to his natural parents or placed for adoption 
.... (T]he New York Court of Appeals has '[p]articularly rejected the notion, if that it be, 
that third-party custodians may acquire some sort of squatters' rights in another's child'."). 
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considered to have no "rights" under the Constitution in Timmy, in con-
trast to his biological parents.51 As to the Drummonds' interests as appli-
cants to be Timmy's adoptive parents, the Georgia Supreme Court held that 
the Drummonds even lacked standing to contest the agency denial of their 
request in a court. 52 
Under this view of parent-child relationships, the Drummond majority 
stated the goal of adoptions as follows: " ... to duplicate the relationship 
that most persons have with their natural parents during their entire 
lives. "53 Implicit in this statement is the idea that biological parenthood is a 
constitutionally preferred mode of parenthood. This legal view, in turn, car-
ries with it subtle and largely unconscious influence on agency adoption de-
cisions: the agency understandably perceives its duty as trying to match chil-
dren with adoptive families of the same racial background. 54 
3. A Child's Legal Interests are Defined by the Doctrine of 
"Substitute judgment." 
Traditionally, our basic approach to legal controversies involving chil-
dren has been to use the doctrine of "substitute judgment."55 Using this ap-
proach, an adult decisionmaker should make child placement decisions by 
reference to what he perceives to be the child's best interests ratl)er than by 
reference to what he perceives to be the child's wishes or desires. Despite 
numerous attacks on the doctrine of substitute judgment as a theory of 
child placement decisionmaking by commentators,56 courts, legislatures, and 
51. 563 F.2d at 1207. 
52. 23 7 Ga. at 454, 228 S.E.2d at 844. 
53. 563 F.2d at 1206. 
54. "All Negroes, mulattoes, mestizos, and their descendants, having any ascertainable 
trace of either Negro or African, West Indian or Asiatic Indian blood in their veins, and all de-
scendants of any person having either Negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian blood 
in his or her veins, shall be known in this State as persons of color," GA. CODE ANN. § 
79-103 (1973) (repealed 1979). 
55. This term has been used recently by courts considering the propriety of withholding 
medical treatment from an "incompetent", see Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 77 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431-32 (1977), and ordering medical treatment for a 
child against its parent's wishes, see Custody of a Minor, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2002, 379 N.E.2d 
1053 (Mass. 1978). Commentators have criticized the substitute judgment doctrine on the 
grounds that it allows courts to purport to rely on the wishes of a party who is not present, or 
is unable to express their wishes, without recognizing that the court infuses its perception of 
the party's wishes with its own ambivalence and anxiety. Burt, The Limits of Law and 
Regulating Health Care Decisions, 7 THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 29, 32 (December 1977). 
Others have noted that while courts are willing to supervise parental judgment to the extent of 
disregarding parental autonomy in child medical treatment decisions, the state rarely accepts 
the responsibility for nurturing the children it "saves". Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at 
Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.]. 645, (1977). 
56. See Burt, supra note 9, at 143; Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A 
Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.]. 887 (1975); Wald, 
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child welfare agencies continue to use the doctrine in defining a child's 
legal interests. We should not be surprised that agency officials in Drum-
mond justified their rejection of the Drummonds in terms of doing what 
was in Timmy's "long range best interest."57 Thus in the agency's view, 
Timmy had to suffer the immediate psychological harm of separation from 
the Drummonds to avoid the future social and psychological harms of being 
a child of an interracial family. 5R Even if Timmy wanted in his childlike way 
to live with the Drummonds, the agency treated this desire, however ex-
pressed, as incompetent and uninformed. 
The Georgia Supreme Court gave practical effect to the theory of sub-
stitute judgment by declaring that Timmy was not even a party to the law-
suit. 59 Under this theory the agency, and perhaps the adults involved in the 
litigation, could protect Timmy's interests, but he clearly had no cognizable 
legal rights that a court need recognize or enforce.60 The agency's action in 
Drummond was affirmatively sanctioned since the agency, as "substitute par-
ent"61 was under a moral and legal obligation to do what it thought to be in 
Timmy's best interests. 
Constitutional litigation62 and changing patterns in American family life 
have raised serious questions about the appropriateness of substitute judg-
ment as a means of defining a child's legal rights in all circumstances. The 
initial panel opinion in Drummond at least recognized that Timmy might 
have interests independent of those of the Drummonds or the agency 
which might be judicially recognized. 63 As a result, the court of appeals, in 
accordance with the practice in other federal litigation over child place-
ment64 appointed a lawyer to represent Timmy's interests. 65 Even so, in the 
en bane opinion, Timmy's interests were considered secondary to those of 
the Drummonds and the agency.66 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit derived 
Stale Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for RealiJtic StandardJ, 27 STAN-
FORD L. REv. 985 (1975). 
57. 547 F.2d at 847. 
58. This view is echoed in Judge Roney"s opinion for the en bane opinion: "'[T)he State"s 
motive in interrupting Timmy"s environment at any point was always to move him to a place 
which it considered superior, over the long range, for his particular needs at the time."" 563 
F.2d at 1209. 
59. 23 7 Ga. at 455, 228 S.E.2d at 844. 
60. See note 55 Jupra. 
61. See generally, Burt, Jupra note 9. 
62. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen-
dent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Parham 
v. ).L., 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D.Ga. 1976), rev'd, U.S. Sup. Ct., No. 75-1690,47 U.S.L.W. 4740 
(June 20, 1979). 
63. 547 F.2d at 856. 
64. See Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. 
Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
65. 532 F.2d 1001 (1976) (purJuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)). 
66. E.g., 563 F.2d at 1208, and Jee text accompanying notes 151-55, infra. 
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from its analysis of the Drummonds' rights its holding that Timmy had no 
constitutional rights that were violated. 67 This constitutional holding was 
made by a court which did not have the benefit of Timmy's lawyer's partici-
pation in the proceedings below. 68 
Despite this federal practice and commentators' support for indepen-
dent party status for the child, 69 there has been very little discussion of the 
ramifications of party status for. the child in judicial opinions. Not surpris-
ingly, the judges in Drummond referred to Timmy's "rights" in terms of an 
idealized view of a proper American childhood. 70 There w~s no recognition 
that the intervention of law into Timmy's life required an articulation of his 
legal interests. 71 
Without a general theory of a child's legal rights, there was no defini-
tion of the role of the child's lawyer. Although Timmy's lawyer might have 
looked to commentators for guidelines on litigation strategy in this situation 
few, if any, commentators offer any explicit alternatives to the substitute 
judgment doctrine. The lawyer might have analyzed the litigation as an at-
tempt by the state agency to exercise its "child protection function," an 
approach that has support among some commentators. 72 Using this anal-
ysis Timmy's lawyer would have argued that the agency underestimated the 
harm of removal in trying to protect the child. Under this theory Timmy's 
lawyer should have been motivated to join forces with the Drummonds' 
lawyer to prevent the removal. Adopting this role also would have put 
Timmy's advocate in the morally comfortable position of arguing that 
a racially-motivated denial of the adoption by the Drummonds was 
incorrect. 73 
But assuming Timmy's lawyer adopted this analytical framework, it did 
not provide continual guidance during the Drummond litigation. 74 Once a 
child has been moved to another family, there is no analysis that aids the 
child's lawyer in defining a position independent from adults involved in 
the case. In Drummond, Timmy's lawyer had no opportunity to define the 
issues as tripartite ones among Timmy, the Drummonds, and the agency, 
67. 563 F.2d at 1209, and see, text accompanying notes 139-41, infra. 
68. Timmy's counsel was appointed on May 16, 1976, three months after the district 
coun had dismissed the Drummonds' complaint. 532 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1976). 
69. Cf. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at 65-67; Mnookin I, supra note 14, at 254-55. 
70. See, e.g., text accompanying note 53, supra. 
71. Drummond v. Fulton Counry Dept. of Family Etc., 563 F.2d 1200 (1977). 
72. See Mnookin I, supra note 14, at 229. 
73. Petitioner's Brief for a Writ of Certiorari at 20, Timmy Lee Hill v. Fulton Cry. Dept. 
of Family, etc., In the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 77-6454 (1977). 
74. See Mnookin I, supra note 14, at 254. Cf Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of 
Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L. J. 1126 
(1978). (Lawyers representing children in divorce/child custody disputes have expressed confu-
sion and the need for more guidance in their role, emphasizing its complex and shifting na-
rure). 
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since Timmy's lawyer never had an opportunity to see Timmy or the agen-
cy's files on Timmy. 75 
Thus the legal context into which Timmy was born had certain consti-
tutional perimeters that permitted or encouraged the agency to react or not 
to react in certain ways. First, the concept that the Constitution protects bi-
ological parenthood encouraged deliberate agency action toward legal disso-
lution of Timmy's relationship to his biological mother. The sanctity of bio-
logical parenthood also encouraged the agency practice of matching children 
to parents of the same race. 76 Second, any adult's relationship to Timmy 
not based on biology was seen as only a creation of positive law rather than 
as "fundamental" or constitutional in its nature. As a result, the agency used 
informal proceedings in denying the Drummonds' request to adopt Timmy. 
The Fifth Circuit opinion in Drummond has given constitutional sanction to 
this informal approach to potential adoptive parents' interests by state child 
welfare agencies. Third, Timmy's "rights" as a child were defined in terms 
of substitute judgment by adults or the agency even though we know that 
children are not to be viewed as chattels or parental property, but as "per-
sons" within the fourteenth amendment. 77 As a result of this definition of 
Timmy's rights in terms of others' legal interests, his lawyer's role was not 
defined. As the next section illustrates, the cumulative effects of these con-
cepts were to establish child welfare agency discretion as a constitutional 
theory of adoption. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF DRUMMOND: 
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD WELFARE AGENCY 
The constitutional theory of Drummond consists of a combination of 
the majority opinion in the en bane case, Drummond II, 78 and the dissenting 
opinion in the initial panel decision, Drummond I. 79 Both of these opin-
ions, written by Judge Roney, are connected because the majority in 
Drummond II explicitly adopted the reasoning of the dissent in Drummond I. 
The constitutional theory of the majority in Drummond II is, however, more 
than the analysis of the dissent in Drummond I. During the eight month 
interval between Drummond I and II, the United States Supreme Court 
handed down its decision upholding the constitutionality of the system for 
removing children from foster care homes in New York, Smith v. Organiza-
75. See noce 68 supra. 
76. See cexc accompanying noces 134-38 infra. 
77. See Organization of Foscer Families for Equalicy and Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. 
Supp. 277, 282 (1976), accord, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-8 (1973). 
78. 563 F.2d ac 1203. 
79. 547 F.2d ac 857. 
14 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11: 1 
tion of Foster Families for Equality and Reform. 80 The majority's discussion in 
Drummond II integrates this Supreme Court precedent on foster care 
decisionmaking into the analysis set forth in the Drummond I dissent. Thus, 
to discover the Drummond II majority's theory of the decisionmaking au-
thority of courts, child welfare agencies, adults and children in structuring 
relationships between children and parents of all kinds, we must analyze all 
three opinions. 
A. judge Roney's Theory in Drummond I 
Judge Roney's dissenting opinion in Drummond I defined the issue 
presented by the case in terms of the authority of the child welfare agency 
to make decisions regarding adoption. He asks: "may a state agency, 
charged with the responsibility of placing for adoption a child in its legal cus-
tody, take into consideration the race of the child and the race of the pro-
spective adoptive parent without violating the Constitution of the United 
States?"81 Judge Roney's characterization of the issue as racial is a perspec-
tive that led him directly to a case promulgating a constitutional doctrine on 
interracial adoptions. R2 That constitutional doctrine invalidated on equal 
protection grounds any statute prohibiting interracial adoption. Ra In this 
case the court was not confronted with a statute prohibiting interracial 
adoptions. In Judge Roney's view the record did not even support a finding 
that the agency had adopted a policy denying interracial adoptions. Rather 
the question was whether the agency, in the "exercise of its own discretion-
ary concepts of successful child placement,"84 could constitutionally con-
sider the race of the child and the race of the adoptive parents as an impor-
tant factor in adoption decisionmaking. 
By framing the issue in terms of the agency's discretionary authority, 
Judge Roney misconstrued what the Drummonds were seeking both sub-
stantively and procedurally. Substantively, the Drummonds attacked the dis-
trict court's conception of the case. The Drummonds were not complaining 
about a general agency policy regarding interracial adoption. Since everyone 
admitted race was a factor in the decision to deny adoption, the Drum-
monds were asking the court of appeals to establish a constitutional rule of 
how much consideration race could be given in an individual case. The gra-
vamen of their argument was that the agency went too far in this regard: 
they had been rejected as adoptive parents because of their race without 
any additional inquiry into their suitability to be Timmy's parents. As fac-
tual support for their theory, the Drummonds were asking the court to find 
80. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) [hereinafter cited as OFFER}. 
81. 547 F.2d at 857. 
82. Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.La. 1972). 
83. Id. 
84. 547 F.2d at 858. 
1979} ADOPTION 15 
that a decision not to allow their adoption of Timmy had been made even 
before the March 10, 1975 meeting. The Drummonds' status as foster par-
ents was significant to their proposed constitutional theory since everyone 
admitted they had been extremely successful foster parents. The 
Drummonds also believed the court should decide the case in their favor 
without formulating a new constitutional rule distinguishing their case, 
where there had been two years of day-to-day involvement with the pro-
spective adoptive child, from those cases in which prospective applicants 
sought to adopt children with whom they had had no previous contact. 
Because of the lack of procedures in the agency's decisionmaking, the 
Drummonds argued that the district court could not determine what the 
agency policies were regarding adoption in general or the adoption of 
Timmy in particular and therefore could not tell whether race was used in 
an unconstitutional manner vis-a-vis the adoption. This lack of procedure 
was the basis of the Drummonds' procedural due process claim. The general 
policy of the agency as demonstrated in the standard foster care contract 
would indicate that the Drummonds would not even be considered as 
adoptive parents. 85 Yet, their request to adopt Timmy was finally consid-
ered in November, 1975,86 despite a possible argument that the agency had 
told them they would not be considered in March, 1975 because of their 
race. 87 In point of fact, unintentional and intentional miscommunication re-
garding Timmy's adoption was present throughout the agency's relationship 
with the Drummonds. 88 In asking for a reversal of the dismissal, the 
Drummonds were asking the court of appeals to establish a constitutional 
procedure for adoption decisionmaking that would enable a court to deter-
mine if their race or their suitability as Timmy's adoptive parents was the 
basis of the agency's decision. 89 
Having framed the issue in terms of agency discretionary powers, 
Judge Roney quickly disposed of the Drummonds' substantive due process 
claim. He found the Drummonds' "liberty interest" in adopting Timmy to 
be nonexistent. 90 Judge Roney reasoned that if the Drummonds had a lib-
erty interest in choosing an adoptive child, Timmy must also have a liberty 
interest in "choosing the best suitable parents."91 But since Timmy could 
not choose, the agency as his legal custodian had to choose his adoptive 
parents for him: "Because an infant is incapable of exercising that right for 
85. 563 F.2d at 1203. 
86. 547 F.2d at 846. 
87. Id. at 839. 
88. E.g., Memo from Mrs. Dallinger to Miss Mollie Barlett (Aug. 1975): "I personally 
feel that the Drummonds are back into their earlier denial pattern. The approach I recommend 
for you is to stall with no encouragement." 547 F.2d at 841. 
89. 547 F.2d at 849. 
90. Id. at 858. 
91. Id. 
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himself, however, under Georgia law either the parents who voluntarily 
give up a child for adoption or the agency given legal custody of a child must 
exercise the right for him." (emphasis added)92 
The Drummonds relied upon an equal protection theory in their claim 
that a hearing should have been granted where the impermissible factor of 
race may have been used. Since Judge Roney believed in the constitutional 
permissibility of the use of race in agency adoption decisionmaking he gave 
their equal protection argument very limited treatment. 93 Judge Roney did 
not discuss whether the use of race required the court to use "strict scru-
tiny" before validating the agency's decision. 94 Instead, he reduced the issue 
of race into one of factual interpretation of what the agency did: "This rec-
ord reflects nothing more than a large number of agency and social work-
ers with unquestioned credentials endeavoring to find a permanent family 
home for Timmy that would be best for him for the rest of his life."95 The 
Drummonds' reliance on their two year status as foster parents as legally 
distinguishing their case from other cases did not alter Judge Roney's gen-
eral view since state law did not create any legal interest in foster parents. 96 
In concluding this discussion of the particular process of staffing used to 
deny the Drummonds' request to adopt Timmy, Judge Roney declared: 
"The case worker system of social service established by the state for the 
processing of these very difficult personal and social decisions should not 
be destroyed under constitutional edict."97 
92. Id. at 858-59. 
93. Id. at 860. 
94. There is some indication in the Supreme Court's recent case, University of California 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), that a court is required to use "strict scrutiny" when consider-
ing an individual's claim against the state's use of a racial classification. As a result, the burden 
is on the state to justify the use of race in terms of "compelling governmental interest". Id. 
289-91, 299, and 305. 
Judge Roney's approach, however, places the burden of proof on the Drummonds. See 563 
F.2d at 1205. 
Judge Roney's position on "race", while perhaps incorrect, is not discussed more fully in 
this article. A discounting of Judge Roney's analysis of the race issue might imply that the 
Drummonds had a "right" to adopt Timmy, a position which is explicitly rejected by this arti-
cle. See Part III infra. 
Another reason for not exploring the race issue is that under such an analysis, a court 
would try to determine the agency's "motive." See, e.g., 564 F.2d 126; Comment, Reading the 
Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De jure DiJtinction, 86 YALE L. ). 
317 (1976). The agency's denial of the Drummonds' adoption request is sutticiently peculiar to 
make us more comfortable with an analysis that does not determine the agency's motive. The 
record of agency actions, irs delays, reversals of position, and divergence of opinions on 
Timmy's adoption by the Drummonds supports a view of the result as a product of intra-
agency forces rather than a reasoned decision on the weight of race in Timmy's adoption. 
95. Id. at 858. 
96. Id. at 859. 
97. Id. at 860. 
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Judge Roney dealt with the claims advanced by Timmy's court-
appointed counsel in Drummond I on the assumption that the agency's and 
Timmy's interests were identical. 98 The Drummonds' reliance on such cases 
in In Re Gau/t 99 to support their demand for a hearing was in Judge 
Roney's view misplaced because Gault involved a situation in which the 
child's interest in remaining in the custody of his parent conflicted with the 
state's interest in enforcing its penal laws. In his view, these cases were in-
applicable "where the state interest in finding the best home for Timmy co-
incides perfectly with his interest." 100 A lawyer for Timmy or another adult 
appointed to represent his interests at a hearing could not protect his inter-
est in agency adoption decisionmaking any better than the caseworker sys-
tem did. The state's and Timmy's interest were apparently so congruent that 
Judge Roney, an appellate judge, could determine Timmy's rights without 
formal participation by his counsel in the trial below. 101 
B. Drummond II: judge Roney's Interpretation of Smith v. OFFER 
Judge Roney's conclusion about the influence of the child's and agen-
cy's interest in Drummond I colored his description of the facts in Drum-
mond II. Having adopted the discussion, reasoning and result of his dissent 
in Drummond I, Judge Roney then recapitulated the facts as follows: 
In December, 1973 in an emergency situation, a one month 
old mixed race child named Timmy was placed for temporary care 
in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Drummond by the Fulton County 
children's service agency. Lengthy proceedings were commenced 
to determine whether the child should be permanently removed 
from his natural mother's custody and placed for adoption. 102 
Nothing in the record in Drummond I supports this description, particularly 
the statement about the lengthy proceedings regarding the rights of 
Timmy's biological mother. 103 But Judge Roney was merely setting the 
stage for a further elaboration of his constitutional theory of adoption in 
Drummond I in light of a new Supreme Court precedent. 
The constitutional claims of both the Drummonds' and Timmy's coun-
sel in Drummond II required more than a simple restatement of the Drum-
mond I dissent. 
98. 54 7 F.2d at 860. 
99. 387 u.s. 1 (1967). 
100. 547 F.2d at 860. 
10 l. See note 68 supra. 
102. 563 F.2d at 1203. 
103. Cf. 547 F.2d at 842. The record supports, rather, a picture of lengthy delay by the 
agency before such proceedings were ever commenced, and then a relatively short judicial ter-
mination process. 
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To best understand the significance of Justice Brennan's opinion a full 
description of Smith v. OFFER 104 is required. A group of foster parents 
originally brought a class action against the state, city, and county welfare 
officials as well as a voluntary child care agency in New York. 105 The foster 
parents sought to have a three-judge federal court declare the New York 
statutory scheme for removal of foster children from their homes un-
constitutional. 106 The district court appointed independent counsel to rep-
resent the class of foster children, 107 and allowed a number of biological 
parents who had "voluntarily"108 placed their children in foster care to in-
tervene in the lawsuit. The court thus transformed the suit into a tripartite 
controversy. As defined by the district court, there were three classes of 
private litigants: (1) foster parents who had foster children in their homes 
for more than a year; (2) all foster children who had lived with foster par-
ents for one year on a continuous basis; and (3) all biological parents who 
had voluntarily placed their children in foster care. 109 
The significant feature of the removal procedure was that the actual re-
moval of the child was stayed if a foster parent objected pending the initial 
administrative review.U 0 If the purpose of the removal was to transfer the 
child to another foster home, then administrative regulations required ten 
days advance notice to the foster parents of the intended removal.U 1 This 
notice was to inform the foster parents that if they objected to removal 
they must request a conference. 112 The conference was essentially an in-
formal internal agency review. If, after a conference, the agency still sought 
to remove the child, the parent could appeal for a full administrative "fair 
hearing" and judicial review. 113 The foster parent might, if a court granted a 
stay, keep physical custody of the child during these appeals. On the other 
hand, if a foster parent failed to object to removal of the child upon receipt 
of the notice, the agency could remove the child and the foster parent, as a 
"person aggrieved" by agency action, would have to sue in court to get the 
child back. If the foster parents wanted the foster child removed there was 
no requirement for a hearing. 
A different procedure was required if the foster child was being re-
turned to the biological parent.U 4 In the case of a voluntary placement, the 
104. 431 u.s. 816 (1977). 
105. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 
277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
106. /d. at 278 n.l. 
107. /d. at 278. 
108. See text accompanying notes 181-83 infra. 
109. 418 F. Supp. at 278 n.3. 
110. 431 U.S. at 830. 
111. /d. at 829. 
112. /d. 
113. /d. at 830. 
114. /d. at 829. 
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biological parent in theory had the right to demand the child back upon 20 
days notice. 115 In such a case, the foster parent would have no statutory 
right to a pre-removal hearing. At least in New York City, however, it was 
the administrative practice to grant a pre-removal hearing to any objecting 
foster parent regardless of the child's destination. 116 
Although counsel for the class of foster parents had argued "that the 
foster home is entitled to the same constitutional deference as that long 
granted the traditional biological family," 117 the district court found the 
New York statutory scheme for removal unconstitutional because the foster 
child had an independent right "to be heard before being 'condemned to 
suffer grievous loss'." 118 In the district court's view, the New York statu-
tory scheme was constitutionally deficient because it failed to provide the 
foster child with a hearing without an objection to removal by the foster 
parent. 119 
The Supreme Court reversed the three judge court ruling. In Justice 
Brennan's view, the particular statutory and regulatory scheme for removal 
at issue was constitutional since it adequately accommodated the interests of 
the two classes of parents involved in the foster child's life. First, Justice 
Brennan reasoned that if the foster parents had a liberty interest, it was less 
than the liberty interest of biological parents. 120 The interests of foster par-
ents were adequately protected by the system of removal that the agency 
had to use when it proposed to remove the foster child from the foster 
home. 
Second, as in most states, the biological parents' interest was protected 
by the state's explicit policy asserting that the children should remain with 
their biological parents. 121 In Justice Brennan's view, if the child were being 
returned to the biological parent, the constitution allowed the legislature to 
ignore the foster parent's interest. 122 The statute provided that the biolog-
ical parent could agree to a return date in the foster care agreement or 
force the agency to return the child upon twenty days notice. 123 
The legislature did not define the child's interests in the New York 
foster care transfer system. Perhaps the legislature presumed that the "often 
complex and often unclear" 124 definition of the role of foster parents, bio-
115. /d. at 825. 
116. /d. at 831 n.28. This apparent confusion in New York law and administrative prac-
tice was not resolved by the court. 
117. 418 F. Supp. at 281. 
118. /d. at 282. 
119. Id. 
120. 431 U.S. at 846-47. 
121. /d. at 823. 
122. Id. at 825. 
123. /d. 
124. /d. at 826. 
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logical parents, and state welfare agencies in the New York system defined 
by implication the child's rights. Even if the confusion caused some emo-
tional harm to some children, 125 the legislature seems to have assumed that 
the needs of the class of foster care children were met through the system 
that granted foster parents, biological parents, and the agency some mea-
sure of procedural protection. Justice Brennan apparently adopted this view 
for his opinion upheld the legislative assumption that a foster child's inter-
ests are protected if the foster and biological parents' interests are pro-
tected.126 
The Supreme Court opinion upholding the constitutionality of the 
New York system for removing foster children from foster homes, 
OFFER,127 contained language extremely favorable to the Drummonds. In 
the majority opinion for the Court in OFFER, Justice Brennan stated: 
The importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals in-
volved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments 
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the 
role it plays in "promoting a way of life" through the instruction of 
children as well as from the fact of blood relationship. No one 
would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent 
relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may 
exist even in the absence of blood relationship. At least where a 
child has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known 
his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several 
years in the care of the same foster parents, it is natural that the 
foster family should hold the same place in the emotional life of 
the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing functions, as a nat-
ural family. For this reason, we cannot dismiss the foster family as 
a mere collection of unrelated individuals. 128 
Based on this language and other statements in Justice Brennan's opinion 
suggesting that the legal status of the family was not controlling in constitu-
tional adjudication, 129 the Drummonds attacked Judge Roney's earlier asser-
tion in Drummond I that "foster parents had no legal interest."130 
There are three possible ways of distinguishing OFFER from Drum-
mond. First, Justice Brennan's language quoted above must be understood in 
125. Id. at 826 n.16. 
126. Id. at 840 n.43. 
127. 431 u.s. 816 (1977). 
128. 431 U.S. at 844-45. 
129. E.g., "The legal status of families has never been regarded as controlling: 'Nor has 
the [Constitution] refused to recognize those family relationship unlegitimized by marriage 
ceremony.' Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. at 651." 431 U.S. at 845 n.53. 
130. 547 F.2d at 859. 
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the context of his overall analysis that a foster parent unwilling to object to 
removal of the foster child was not entitled to complain about the child's 
return to a biological parent or his transfer to another foster home. 131 
Nothing in Justice Brennan's basic reasoning implied a lack of liberty inter-
est if the foster parent, like the Drummonds, objected to removal. Second, 
Justice Brennan's opinion did not deal directly with an actual controversy, 
as did Drummond, over the standards for removing a foster child since 
OFFER was a class action proceeding over what removal procedures were 
due rather than over the substantive standard for removal. 132 Third, OFFER 
said nothing explicit about the constitutional interests of foster parents 
seeking not only to prevent removal, but also to adopt the foster child who 
was legally free for adoption. 
Judge Roney rejected all of the three proposed methods of distinguish-
ing OFFER from the Drummonds' claim. Instead Judge Roney relied upon 
the fact that the Drummonds sought to adopt Timmy as a justification for 
holding the Drummonds had no liberty interest under OFFER. Judge 
Roney deemed a rwo year period in foster care to be merely a transitional 
phase in Timmy's ultimate adoption by the best adoptive parents133 selected 
by the agency. He interpreted OFFER in light of his initial purpose of al-
lowing the agency to "duplicate the relationship that most persons have 
with . . . their natural parents during their entire lives" in the adoption 
process. 134 
Moreover, Judge Roney stated that race could be considered in adop-
tion because, "[i}t is a natural thing for children to be raised by parents of 
their same ethnic background."135 He cited cases allowing consideration of 
the religion of adoptive parents to support his view on race without stating 
that an underlying justification of those cases is the protection of the inter-
est of religiously based adoption agencies. 136 Judge Roney evaluated the use 
131. 431 U.S. at 850. 
132. !d. at 819-820. 
133. 563 F.2d at 1207. 
134. !d. at 1206. 
135. !d. at 1205. 
136. Judge Roney cited generally to the Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, 48 
A.LR.3d 383 (1973). While it is true that ""numerous courts have found no constitutional in-
firmity," 563 F.2d at 1205, in religious matching statutes, many courts have strictly limited the 
use of religion as a factor in evaluating prospective adoptive parents. Indeed, the head case of 
the annotation to which Judge Roney cited, In Re Adoption of E, 59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 
(1971), held that religion should be used as a factor only when 1) the child's natural parents 
object to the religion of the potential adoptive parents or 2) a child's prior religious training 
cannot be pursued in the prospective adoptive home, or would cause the child emotional dis-
turbance in the proposed placement. In Dickins v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 66, 281 N.E.2d 
153, 156, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346, 349 (1972), the court, sustaining the validity of New York's reli-
gious matching statute in the face of a constitutional attack stated: "'Legislation which provides 
for the placement ofa child with adoptive parents of the same religion so far as consistent with 
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of race in adoption to be part of the agency program to give the child a 
"normal" family experience by duplicating "his natural biological environ-
ment."137 If the agency could consider physical aspects in adoption, it could 
necessarily consider race. 138 As elaborated in Drummond II, Judge Roney's 
theory of the use of racial considerations in adoption is a constitutional en-
dorsement of the agency practice of "matching." 
The attempts by Timmy's lawyer to use OFFER as support for Timmy's 
own constitutional interest against removal were also rejected by Judge 
Roney. 139 Timmy's counsel argued that Timmy's right to a "stable environ-
ment'' meant that the agency must justify its interference with Timmy's fos-
ter family relationship with the Drummonds. 140 The Drummonds had been 
the only family Timmy had ever known, at least during his first two years. 
There were no competing liberty interests of biological parents at issue. 
Judge Roney, however, interpreted every state interference with Timmy's 
environment as "superior over the long range." 141 As a result, Timmy had 
no recognizable liberty interest under the circumstances of the case. Essen-
tially Judge Roney read OFFER as allowing the state agency, as substitute 
parent, to decide for Timmy what his interests are. 
Judge Roney's position on the lack of liberty interest on either the 
Drummonds' or Timmy's part, made his procedural due process analysis of 
OFFER in Drummond II rather straightforward. In Judge Roney's view, 
since OFFER did not hold that the New York system was the only constitu-
tional model of removal of foster children, the constitution permitted flexi-
ble procedures. 142 Given the nature of the interests at stake, and the in-
the best interests of the child and where practicable, ... undoubtedly fulfills a secular legisla-
tive purpose and certainly reflects and preserves a benevolent neutrality toward religion." The 
court was silent, however, concerning what the legislative purpose was. Wilder v. Sugarman 
385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), construing the same statute plus its funding provisions, 
found that the statute preserved a balance berween the First Amendment Establishment Clause 
and the free exercise rights of parents, id. at 1025, and children. Id. at 1026. The Court noted 
that, in examining the New York statutory scheme, one must take into account the long 
history of community contributions made by religously affiliated child care institutions. Id. 
at 1027. The Wilder analysis may be valid if applied only to children who are to be placed in 
foster homes, but if a child is being placed for adoption, any free exercise right of the natural 
parent has been abrogated. The state, in loco parentis, has no free exercise rights. See Note, 
Religious Matching Statutes and Adoption, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 262, 282-3 (1976). A state's impu-
tation of a religous identity for a child in the absence of prior religious training, ignores the 
natural parents' indifference, and works against the best interests of the child by arbitrarily 
eliminating qualified adoptive parents. The only interest served is that of organized religion. 
See Comment, A Reconsideration of the Religious Element in Adoption, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 780, 
817-18 (1971). 
137. 563 F.2d at 1205. 
138. Id. at 1206; but see note 97 supra. 
139. See text accompanying note 128 supra. 
140. 563 F.2d at 1208. 
141. Id. at 1209. 
142. Id. 
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quiry involved, as well as the overwhelming need for flexibiliry in the 
situation and the complexiry of the decision to be made the "procedures" 
or the method used by the agency to decide upon Timmy's adoption were 
constitutionally adequate. 143 Judge Roney's ultimate goal was to free the 
agency adoption decisions from the "trial-like" procedures that he assumed 
Timmy's lawyer and the Drummonds were arguing were constitutionally re-
quired.144 
C. judge Tuttle's Alternative Theory of Smith v. OFFER in Drummond II 
Judge Tuttle's dissent in Drummond II was more sensitive to Timmy's 
interests than Judge Roney's opinions. Yet, Judge Tuttle's dissent was not a 
complete answer to Judge Roney's opinions in Drummond I and II. Judge 
Tuttle failed to note that the Drummond II majoriry had initially adopted 
the Drummond I dissent, and by implication Judge Roney's formulation of 
the overall issue in the case. Where Judge Roney had defined the issue in 
terms of the authoriry of child welfare agencies to make decisions about a 
child's adoption in Drummond I, Judge Tuttle had defined the issue in terms 
of the federal courts' power to grant relief to white foster parents trying to 
adopt an interracial child. 
Judge Tuttle's dissent in Drummond II ignored these different starting 
points in analyzing the problems presented by Drummond. Rather his dis-
sent in Drummond II dealt primarily with the implications of OFFER, the 
foster care precedent, rather than with the basic inadequacies of Judge 
Roney's constitutional theory of adoption. 
Judge Tuttle's dissenting opinion in Drummond II correctly pointed out 
that, in contrast to the concurring opinions in OFFER, Justice Brennan's 
majoriry opinion supported the view that the Drummonds as foster parents 
had some liberry interest. 145 The concurring justices' opinion in OFFER 
would have upheld the New York foster care removal system on the theory 
that the foster parents had no constitutional liberry interests. 146 Justice 
Brennan, on the other hand, upheld the system on the theory that the par-
ticular liberty interests of foster paref!tS were adequately protected by a sys-
tem that required them to make known to the agency their opposition to 
removal of the foster child. 
1 Judge Tuttle's analysis in Drummond II did note one of the differences 
between Drummond and OFFER. OFFER was essentially a controversy 
among biological parents, foster parents, and foster children. Drummond, by 
contrast was, at least originally, 147 a suit between private parties and a state 
143. ld. at 1210. 
144. ld. 
145. ld. at 1213-14. 
146. 431 U.S. at 857. 
147. See text accompanying notes 230-231. 
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agency. Judge Tuttle stated that, "but for the existence of the narrower 
ground in that case and but for the fact that the contest before the court 
was being waged between foster parents on the one hand, and natural par-
ents on the other, the court would readily have determined that such 
constitutionally-protected liberty interest did exist." 148 In Judge Tuttle's 
view, the difference meant the Drummonds had a constitutional interest. 
Judge Tuttle did not, however, recognize the other differences be-
tween Drummond and OFFER. The Drummonds were seeking, through liti-
gation, an actual result vis-a-vis the child, whereas the plaintiffs in OFFER 
were seeking only a procedural innovation in agency practice. The original 
plaintiff foster parents in OFFER wanted pre-removal hearings without hav-
ing to ask for them. These plaintiffs were thus asking for legal relief with-
out affirmation that their relationship to the child be legally recognized as 
permanent. 149 In contrast, the Drummonds were actual "psychological par-
ents" desiring to adopt a child in their care. By distinguishing the 
Drummonds' position in the litigation from that of the OFFER plaintiffs, 
Judge Tuttle could have forced the majority to confront the question of 
whether Timmy's emotional needs at that point in his life were more im-
portant than his "long range best interest."150 Although the analysis of the 
majority is couched in procedural terms, in substance the majority holds 
that the agency's judgment that Timmy had to suffer present harm to avoid 
possible future harm was the constitutionally correct standard for child 
placement decisions. By accepting the reasoning of the welfare agency con-
cerning Timmy's long range interests the majority essentially supports the 
use of race as a controlling factor in child placement. Had Judge Tuttle 
been able to raise this question, he would have at least forced the majority 
to see the issue of substantive constitutional rights that underlie its suppos-
edly procedural analysis. 
Judge Tuttle's opinion in Drummond II was elusive regarding the proce-
dural due process claims. As he had stated in Drummond I, Judge Tuttle still 
believed that the solution in the case lay in devising a procedure for foster 
parents who seek to adopt. 151 Yet Judge Tuttle's analysis of Timmy's rights 
under OFFER suggested Timmy had an "opportunity to be heard" within 
the agency on his adoption. 152 While this view of Timmy's rights as possibly 
148. 563 F.2d at 1213. 
149. There may have been strategic reasons why plainriffs attacked the procedures rather 
than expressing a desire to adopt. First, they may have recognized the hostility of the Court to 
a substantive due process argument. Second, at the rime, there was no precedent such as 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), that would suggest, if not mandate, 
substanrive due process protection of alternative modes of parenting. 
150. 547 F.2d ar 847. 
151. 563 F.2d at 1219. 
152. Jd. at 1218-19. Cf 547 F.2d at 857. 
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independent of the agency's rights contrasts with Judge Roney's view that 
the interests of Timmy and the agency are congruent, Judge Tuttle's view 
misreads OFFER. The district court in OFFER had based its holding on 
the foster child's lack of opportunity to be heard on his removal. Justice 
Brennan's OFFER opinion obscures the reasoning of the district court on 
the procedural issue. 153 By focusing on Timmy's due process rights without 
recognizing the essential differences between the Drummonds and the 
OFFER plaintiffs, Judge Tuttle could find little solid support in OFFER for his 
analysis. In reiterating his earlier position in Drummond I, Judge Tuttle also 
apparently thought the constitutional permissibility of the consideration of 
race was linked to adequate procedures. 154 He asserted that Judge Roney's 
opinion gave the agency complete discretion regarding adoption, 155 but 
Judge Tuttle did not offer a constitutional theory of why the agency should 
not have this type of discretion, even where race is not involved. 
Development of such a theory would have required Judge Tuttle to ask 
questions about the functions of foster care and adoption in terms of a 
child's interest. Judge Tuttle too easily accepted Judge Roney's fundamental 
assertion in Drummond I that foster care and adoption serve different func-
tions for children. While foster care and adoption may serve different func-
tions for adults or for the state child welfare agency, from the child's per-
spective the function of foster care and adoption are similar. 156 Agencies 
and courts concerned with child welfare should reject Judge Roney's analy-
sis in Drummond I & II because it advocates that the Constitution imposes 
no obligation on the agency, even that of seeing the child's welfare as a dis-
tinct interest from the agency's own institutional interest. Judge Tuttle's 
alternative solution of allowing a child represented by counsel a hearing on 
the adoption is also unsatisfactory because it is based on an inadequate anal-
ysis of the substantive constitutional rights involved in contested adoption 
situations. 
Judge Tuttle's analysis of Timmy's constitutional rights was essentially 
procedural. Under his analysis, Timmy would be entitled to a hearing re-
garding his adoption and to be represented by his own advocate at this 
hearing. 157 But it is unclear whether a child could ever use Judge Tuttle's 
analysis to compel the state agency to treat a particular non-biological child-
adult relationship as a constitutionally-protected family relationship. Nor 
was it clear from Judge Tuttle's opinion whether Timmy's constitutional 
rights are any different in practice from the Drummonds' procedural due 
process rights in the adoption process. 
153. 431 U.S. at 840. 
154. 563 F.2d at 1219. 
155. Id. 
1~6. See Part IliA infra. 
157. 547 F.2d at 856-57; 563 F.2d at 1219. 
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III. PROTECTION OF A CHILD'S RIGHT TO FAMILY 
This article proposes a constitutional analysis of adoption which elimi-
nates both of the deficiencies of Judge Tuttle's analysis. The analysis in-
volves a broader interpretation of the child's "liberty interest" in the adop-
tion process. In this respect the theory seeks to answer the question, "What 
would it mean to say a child has a constitutional right to be adopted?" On 
the procedural level, the theory proposes a method for handling child 
placement conflicts within courts rather than handling those conflicts 
through hearings within the child welfare agencies as suggested by Judge 
Tuttle's analysis. The substantive and procedural aspects of the theory to-
gether seek to allocate the decisionmaking authority of the child, adults, 
and state agencies in the adoption process. 
To develop such a theory we must reexamine, from the perspective of 
a child, the constitutional doctrines which give substantive due process pro-
tection to the family 158 and determine how those cases protect a child's le-
gal interests. The first step in this doctrinal reinterpretation is to demon-
strate that the Court's only case on foster care, OFFER, 159 discussed in the 
previous section, is not, despite Judge Roney's interpretation, antithetical to 
a theory of a child's rights in the adoption process. The second step is to 
provide an analysis, from a child's perspective, of Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 160 the Court's most recent pronouncement on the substantive 
limitations of the state's ability to define the family. By approaching the 
analysis in this manner it can be demonstrated that a child's interest in a 
family is constitutionally protected and is distinct from that of adults or 
child welfare agencies. To define the child's interest in the family in the 
particular context of Drummond, there should have been no rigid, a priori 
constitutional distinction among the foster family, the adoptive family, or 
the biological family. 
A. A Re-interpretation of OFFER: A Definition of Foster Care 
/rom a Child's Perspective 
OFFER differs from most constitutional adjudications which involve the 
child's interests. In most of the Court's cases, the child's interest is dealt 
with as a derivative of the adult's or the state's asserted interests. 161 In con-
trast, the class of foster children involved in OFFER had an advocate 
158. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-171 (1973) (Stewart,)., concurring). 
159. 431 u.s. 816 (1977). 
160. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) [Hereinafter cited as Moore}. 
161. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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throughout the litigation who took a position on the child's constitutional 
rights. OFFER is thus a case in which all interests-the child's, the adults', and 
state's-were actually asserted in the context of constitutional adjudication. 
Consistent with most prevailing analyses of the child's constitutional 
rights, however, special counsel for the children in OFFER perceived the 
problem of litigation strategy as one-dimensional. For special counsel the 
choice was to side with either the biological parents or the foster parents 
rather than develop an independent position for the child. Special counsel's 
greatest concern was that a removal procedure which mandated a pre-removal 
hearing for all foster parents as proposed by counsel for the foster parents 
would cause an unnecessary and deleterious delay in placing the child in a 
stable environment. 162 On this procedural issue the special counsel's posi-
tion was opposed to that of the foster parents and more closely aligned with 
that of the biological parents. 163 
Yet the interests of foster children are not always identical to the inter-
ests of the biological parents. First, Justice Brennan stated in his opinion 
that the position taken by the court-appointed counsel for the children, 
whereby counsel chose to align the children's interest with that of the New 
York system, was not definitive. 164 In holding that the foster parents had 
standing to define the liberty interests of foster children in a manner differ-
ent from that of appointed counsel for the children, Justice Brennan indicat-
ed that all parties to the litigation could define the children's interests. In a 
concurring opinion, three other justices explicitly stated that the foster chil-
dren should not have been left without an advocate for the position that 
they were entitled to a hearing. 165 
On the other hand, the foster parents and several amici166 argued for 
pre-removal hearings, in opposition to counsel for the children. Following 
prevailing constitutional analysis, such hearings were proposed without any 
concrete definition of the foster children's constitutional rights: the conven-
tional "due process" approach to children's constitutional rights is to focus 
on the prevention of arbitrary state decisionmaking. 167 In OFFER, this ap-
proach would have increased the stability of the foster child's environment 
162. With reference to the district court's finding, "The undersigned attorney for the in-
fant plaintiffs had opposed such a finding, on the ground that time being of the essence for 
children, procedures which delayed the decisions concerning removal or non-removal were 
detrimental." Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant-Plaintiffs Danielle and Eric Gandy at 10, 
Smith v. Offer in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
163. 431 U.S. at 839. 
164. Id. 
165. I d. at 85 7 n.l. 
166. Brief of a Group of Concerned Persons for Children as Amici Curiae, Smith v. 
OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). This group included Anna Freud, Joseph Goldstein, and Albert 
Solnit. 
167. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Cf Burt, supra note 9, at 125. 
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by seeking to decrease the incidence of arbitrary state disruption of foster 
home placements. The record in OFFER contains some evidence of the 
agency's tendency to transfer foster children precisely because of the inten-
sity of emotional involvement of the foster parents with the foster chil-
dren.168 One amicus brief offered a more specific justification for more 
elaborate procedures in the context of foster care removal: The purpose of 
the hearing would be to encourage the state to define the complex relation-
ship of the interests of both long term foster parents and oatural parents in 
the foster child.169 While this goal appears in accordance with the foster 
child's interest, the amicus failed to question whether this goal is possible 
under state law or agency practice. 
The substantive child placement doctrine of New York State does not 
recognize the legal interests of foster parents in the child and, by im-
plication, the interests of foster children in sorting out their conflicting loy-
alties.170 In theory, under New York law, in any conflict between biological 
parents and foster parents, the agency should side with biological parents. 
But in point of fact the state resolves conflicts between biological parents 
and foster parents over children by reference to the best interests of the 
child standard. The use of this standard has led to an agency acting as insti-
tutional parent to the children under its supervision with little regard for 
any systematic policy. 171 
For instance, as indicated by the record in OFFER, on one occasion the 
agency saw its role as institutional parent as requiring it to place the child in 
foster care and to resist the efforts of a blind biological parent to have the 
child returned. 172 At other times, the agency's role as institutional parent 
required it to resist the efforts of long term foster parents to keep children 
who no longer remembered their biological parents. 173 Accordingly, New 
York law, despite its procedures for periodic judicial review of the status of 
168. 431 U.S. at 836 n.40. See In Re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 
N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959). 
169. Brief of a Group of Concerned Persons for Children as Amici Curiae at 11, Smith 
v. OFFER,_431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
170. Id. at 826 n.16. 
171. See, e.g., Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 
321 N.Y.S.2d 65, (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805 (1971). But see Nathan M. v. Catholic 
Guardian Society, 76 Misc. 2d 1003, 352 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1973), as evidence of the conflict be-
tween the states preference for biological parents and the "best interest of the child" standard 
of N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 392 (McKinney 1976) where, says the court, "no preference has 
been given to returning the child to its natural parents, although the court may, in its discre-
tion, choose to so order." 76 Misc. 2d at 1005, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 322. 
172. Rodriguez v. Dumpson, 52 A.D.2d 299, 383 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1976) (granting the 
mother custody over the arguments of the agency). 
173. See OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 431 
u.s. 816 (1977). 
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foster care children, 174 is remarkably like Georgia law: It defines decision-
making authority in terms of agency discretion. 
From a child's perspective, the issues presented in OFFER should have 
been addressed in a substantive rather than a procedural constitutional con-
text. A children's advocate could have argued that the system violated their 
liberty interests because of the functional lack of any standards for 
removing foster children. Despite the articulated standard of "best interests 
of the child" for removal, 175 the New York statute does not define the 
child's interest in terms of an actual realistic alternative placement for the 
particular foster child. 1 76 Rather, the removal system is built on the assump-
tion that foster care ought to be categorized primarily as a contractual 
arrangement between adults and child welfare agency with the agency dic-
tating the terms. 177 
Altering this statutory assumption about foster care would require the 
courts to restructure the foster care arrangement from the child's perspec-
tive. From a child's perspective, the primary function of foster care is to al-
low at least one adult to meet needs that would otherwise go unmet. The 
implications of this definition of the purpose of foster care stand in sharp 
contrast to the implication of the adult-centered definition of foster care as 
a temporary way station for the child en route to the biological family or 
prospective adoptive family. 17R The adult-centered definition of foster care 
places the state in the role of substitute parent for a child. In the guise of 
protecting the rights of those unfortunate biological parents who "voluntar-
ily" give up their children, the agency allows foster care to become a more 
or less permanent feature of a child's life! 79 
Whether the child's entry into the foster care system was "volun-
174. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw§ 392 (McKinney 1976). 
175. Id. § 392(7). . 
176. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1977) provides that in reviewing 
the status of a foster care child, the judge may 1) direct that foster care be continued, 2) direct 
the agency involved to return the child to its natural parent(s), 3) direct the agency to institute 
a proceeding to free the child for adoption, or, 4) direct that the child be placed for adoption 
with its foster family or with any other person or persons. Given New York's statutory prefer-
ence for natural parents (see note 125 supra), the last rwo alternatives might be approached 
with hesitation. Even after 24 months have passed in the child's life there would presumably 
be no consideration of alternative placement, e.g., placement in the present foster care home, 
as long as the natural parents are found capable of resuming care for the child. The first 
alternative, continuing foster care, reflects a refusal to make any decision at all, and merely 
lengthens a child's "temporary'' stay in the limbo of foster care. 
177. See, e.g., Ninesling v. Social Servs., 46 N.Y. 2d 382, 386 N.E.2d 235, 413 
N.Y.S.2d 626 (1978). 
178. See, e.g., Judge Roney"s characterization of foster care as "a transitional phase in a 
child's life." 563 F.2d at 1207. 
179. See Mnookin II, supra note 42, at 610-12. 
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tary" 180 because of temporary parental illness, the strain of poverty on his 
biological family, the strain of divorce on a single parent, or "involuntary" 
because of parental neglect or abuse, would not be crucial. What would be 
crucial is the meeting of the child's needs by an adult other than his biolog-
ical parent. 
Accepting this proposed child's definition of foster care has implica-
tions for "constitutional values." 181 This definition of foster care means the 
rejection of the assumption of state competence as substitute parent in the 
adult-centered definition that pervades Justice Brennan's opinion in OFFER. 
Justice Brennan's assumption that the foster parents or biological parents 
could represent the interests of foster children in the intra-agency hearing is 
undermined when one considers that, as substitute parent, the state has in-
fluence over both foster parents and biological parents. The natural parents' 
ability to press any position vigorously against the agency is diminished by 
the agency's ability to change a voluntary placement into an involuntary 
placement. Involuntary placement could mean loss of the child perma-
nently182 or the commencement of criminal proceedings. 183 The foster par-
ents who want to keep the child, because of deep emotional ties to the chil-
dren, must maneuver carefully, lest the agency decide to de-certify their 
home as a suitable or licensed foster home. 184 This is a realistic threat to 
those foster parents who would like to continue to act as parents to chil-
dren under the agency's supervision. In addition, those foster parents who 
need the additional resources that foster children represent for their house-
hold cannot afford to lose the favor of the dispenser of those funds, the 
state agency. 185 
Rejection of the assumption of agency competency as parent means 
that private party determinations of a child's needs should be given defer-
ence in foster care decisionmaking. 186 The agency's lack of deference to pri-
vate party decisionmaking led the agency to threaten one of the litigants in 
OFFER, Ms. Smith, a 53 year old widow with arthritis, with removal of two 
foster children in her care, because the agency, but not she, thought that 
her arthritis impaired her ability to deal with children she had supervised 
180. For the potentially coerced nature of such voluntary placements, see OFFER, 431 
U.S. at 834 and Mnookin I, supra note 14, at 601. 
181. See Burt, supra note 9, at 137. 
182. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977) and N.Y. FAMILY 
COURT ACT § 1055 (McKinney 1975). 
183. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 260.00 (McKinney 1967) and 260.05 and 260.10 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1977). See also N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT§ 254 (McKinney 1975). 
184. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 379 (McKinney 1976). 
185. See Mnookin II, supra note 42, at 610; see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 398-a 
(McKinney 1976). 
186. Private definition of a child's needs are thus preferred to professional or bureau-
cratic definition of those needs. 
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for four years. 1 R7 With a presumption in favor of private determination of a 
child's need, a court could determine that, in Ms. Smith's case, since she 
had met the needs of the two children for four years, her perception of the 
effect of her arthritis on her parental ability should be presumed correct. 
If the foster parent as private party is presumed better able to deter-
mine the child's needs than the agency, then the agency should be forced to 
offer reasons for the removal. Yet in the New York system, the agency can 
change a child's foster care placement without explaining to an outside body 
that removal was the "least detrimental alternative." 1 R8 For instance, New 
York law does not require the agency to explain the return of two of four 
children to their biological mother and the transfer of the other two siblings 
to a foster home, after spending four years united in one foster home. 189 
Given the disruption in the child's life that foster care already represents, a 
presumption in favor of allowing the child to remain in the care of the fos-
ter parent increases the likelihood that the child's needs for stability are met. 
The presumption in favor of foster parents further emphasizes that foster 
care should be defined in terms of persons meeting a child's needs. Under 
this presumption no child would be removed until justification for the re-
moval had been made to a body independent of the foster care officials. In 
effect, the burden of proof as to any changes in foster care placement 
would be on the agency. 
To change the definition of foster care to a child-focused one in the 
context of constitutional adjudication requires a substantive due process 
analysis of a child's rights. Thus the question becomes whether there is any 
constitutional authoriry for redefining the foster family from the child's per-
spective and, therefore, to reject the prevailing adult-centered definition. A 
Supreme Court case decided in the same term as OFFER lends implicit sup-
port to a constitutional re-definition of "family" that favors the child's right 
approach. 
B. Moore v. City of East Cleveland: A Substantive Due Process 
Limitation on the State's Ability to Define Family 
Shortly before the opinion in OFFER was published, the Court decided 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 190 In Moore the Court held the definition of 
"family" in East Cleveland's zoning ordinance unconstitutional. A plurality 
187. 431 U.S.ac818n.l. 
188. See GOLDSTEIN, supra noce 41, ac 53: 
The lease decrimencal alcernacive . . . is chat specific placemenc and procedure for 
placemenc which maximizes, in accord wich che child's sense of cime and on the basis 
of shore cerm predictions given che limitations of knowledge, his or her opportunity 
for being wanced and for maincaining on a concinuous basis a relationship with ac lease 
one adulc who is or will become his psychological parenc. 
189. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
190. 431 u.s. 494 (1977). 
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of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, held the definition invalid be-
cause it violated the home owner's substantive due process right of choice 
in a protected area of family life. 191 A concurring opinion by Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also stated that the ordinance violated 
due process. 192 Justice Brennan's opinion held that the statute's definition 
of family was unreasonable and arbitrary. A concurring opinion by Justice 
Stevens, necessary to complete a five-man majority, held the ordinance 
unconstitutional as an unreasonable interference with the land owner's 
property right. 193 It is the plurality's holding that plays a significant role in 
developing a new theory of a child's constitutional rights. 
The appellant in Moore, Mrs. Inez Moore, owned a duplex in the City 
of East Cleveland. In her portion of the duplex, Mrs. Moore lived with one 
of her two sons, Dale, Sr., and two grandsons, Dale, Jr., and John Moore, 
Jr. 194 This living arrangement violated the city ordinance that limited the 
occupancy of a dwelling unit to a family as defined in the ordinance. The 
reasons the living arrangement violated the statute's terms are unclear from 
the record. The Court proceeded on the theory that Mrs. Moore was the 
"nominal head" of the household. Her unmarried child, Dale, Sr., was ap-
parently her dependent under the ordinance's definition of dependency. 195 
Because of Dale, Sr.'s dependency, the ordinance allowed his dependent 
child to also live with the nominal head of the household, Mrs. Moore. 
John, Jr.'s presence was illegal because he was not the dependent child of 
Dale, Sr. 196 the ordinance classified John, Jr. as an "unlicensed roomer"197 
or as a "family" all by himself. 198 Mrs. Moore was not free to live in the 
house with her son and two grandsons as a single family under the ordi-
nance without applying to the state for its approval of the family arrange-
ment.199 
The city notified Mrs. Moore that her seven-year-old grandson, John, 
Jr. was an illegal occupant. He had been living with Mrs. Moore since the 
death of his mother when he was less than a year old. The city argued that 
John, Jr.'s presence meant there were two families living in a single family 
unit. Mrs. Moore refused to remove John, Jr. from her home. She was con-
191. Id. at 498-506. 
192. Id. at 506-7. 
193. Id. ac 520-21. 
194. I d. ac 496-97. 
195. Id. ac 496 n.2, n.4. 
196. Id. ac 496 n.2, 497 n.4. 
197. Id. ac 507 n.3. 
198. Id. ac 496 n.2. 
199. Justice Burger, in dissent, suggests chat Mrs. Moore's failure co apply for a variance 
before seeking redress in the courts should bar her from raising the issue of the conscicucional-
ity of the local ordinance. 431 U.S. at 521. However, a substantive due process analysis of che 
case indicates that Mrs. Moore's right of choice implies that she does noc have co seek che 
scare's permission. 
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victed of violating the ordinance. She was sentenced to five days in jail and 
fined $25.200 
The conviction was ultimately appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. The Court reversed Mrs. Moore's conviction because the ordinance's 
definition of family was unconstitutional. Justice Powell reasoned that an in-
dividual's freedom of choice in family matters prevented the city from 
defining family as a nuclear family. 201 Mrs. Moore's decision to have her 
son and rwo grandsons live with her as a family was protected from state in-
trusion. To reach this result, Justice Powell had to distinguish Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 202 where the Court had upheld a definition of family in 
a zoning ordinance that excluded unrelated individuals. In distinguishing 
Belle Terre, Justice Powell focused upon the adult's interest in acting as the 
parent of the child as the basis of constitutional protection of family. In 
choosing to parent a child that she did not conceive and bear Mrs. Moore 
was protected, but the associational choice of the college students involved 
in Belle Terre was not. 203 Thus, substantive due process protected Mrs. 
Moore against the state's attempt to standardize child-adult relationships in 
one particular definition of family. 204 Mrs. Moore's right to define her fam-
ily is comparable to an individual's right of choice in marriage or sexual 
procreation without state interference. 205 
Moore could be read solely as an extension of the Court's constitutional 
protection of child-adult relationships to include the grandmother-grand-
child relationship or in Justice Brennan's term "the extended family." 206 
Justice Powell's statement that "the accumulated wisdom of civilization 
... supports a larger conception of the family" 207 supports such a read-
ing. Justice Brennan's concern in his concurring opinion, that failure to give 
constitutional protection to the extended family would have a dispropor-
tionately adverse impact on black families, 20 R would also tend to support an 
interpretation of Moore as simply an extension of Yoder v. Wisconsin, 209 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 210 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 211 A more traditional anal-
ysis of Moore would interpret and critique Moore along these lines. 
Before accepting this interpretation of Moore as solely a protection of 
200. I d. at 497. 
20 l. I d. at 504-06. 
202. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Belle Terre]. 
203. 431 U.S. at 498. 
204. Id. at 506. 
205. Id. at 499. 
206. Id. at 510. 
207. Id. at 505. 
208. Id. at 509-10. 
209. 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
210. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
211. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
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an adult's right to parent a child, we should analyze what was protected 
from John, Jr.'s perspective. First, even though Justice Powell did not dis-
cuss John, Jr.'s rights in his opinion, in protecting Mrs. Moore's decision to 
become a parent, his opinion protects John's relationship with the only 
adult who had met his daily needs during most of his life. Justice Brennan's 
concurring opinion was explicitly concerned with the disruption of John, 
Jr.'s emotional relationship, not only to Mrs. Moore, but to his first cousin, 
Dale, Jr. 212 Of particular interest is the Court's failure to discuss John, Jr.'s 
relationship, if any, to his biological father, John, Sr., in reaching their de-
cision. 213 
Second, when the Court prevented the city from forcing Mrs. Moore 
to send John, Jr. elsewhere, in the absence of a showing of "compelling rea-
sons," the Court protected John's right to remain. The state was relying on 
its constitutional power to zone, rather than on its parens patriae child wel-
fare power in characterizing John as an "illegal occupant" after living seven 
years with his grandmother. From John's perspective, the particular state 
power relied upon to disrupt his family was of little significance. Had the 
state instead relied on its authority as child protector, the same constitu-
tional protection should have been required. The removal of John by the 
state should have required as compelling a showing as would be required to 
dislodge him from his family under the state's zoning power. Thus the 
courts should, under their constitutional authority, protect the stability of a 
child's family relationship from state interference. 214 
Third, besides protecting John, Jr.'s functional familial relationship 
from state interference, the Court's opinion in Moore protected the rights of 
private parties to determine how John's needs should be met. The state ar-
gued that had Mrs. Moore sought to obtain guardianship or to adopt John, 
her relationship with him would then meet the ordinance's "family" defini-
tion. 215 But the Court rejected the argument that Mrs. Moore must put her 
relationship to John into some formal, legally recognized parent-child rela-
tionship. 216 Whatever "disorderliness" was caused by having John's daily 
care, economic support, and general rearing shared by Mrs. Moore and any 
other adult Moores, it should not have been a subject of state concern 
without a showing of actual harm to John. If the less than ideal circum-
212. 431 U.S. at 506 n.2. 
213. Id. at 505 n.16. 
214. But see Judge Roney's rejection of Timmy's counsel's assertion of Timmy's "right to 
a stable environment." 563 F.2d at 1208-09. 
215. Brief for the Appellee at 17-18, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, No. 75-6289 
(1977). 
216. The court also rejected the appellee's argument (accepted by Burger, C.J., in dis-
sent) that since Mrs. Moore failed to seek discretionary administrative relief, she had not ex-
hausted her remedies and should be foreclosed from a hearing before the court. 431 U.S. at 
497 n.5. 
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stances of John, Jr.'s life had led to the adults making private arrangements 
for his daily care, those private arrangements should have been protected 
from state attempts to define John's status in such a way that ignored his 
needs. 217 
The three interests of the child implicit in Moore taken together suggest 
that law has a limited role in defining a child's family. The preference for 
private definition of a child's needs means the actual social circumstances 
are of constitutional significanc~. If the circumstances of a child's life are 
such that an adult meets the daily needs of a child, the state must treat that 
adult-child relationship from the child's perspective as an authentic parent 
relationship. The requirement that the state show a compelling interest be-
fore disrupting the child's relationship to the adults meeting his needs 
means that the child has a right to a stable environment. By treating the 
choice of an adult to pare~t a child in need of nurturance as a con-
stitutionally-protected right, the Moore analysis implicitly suggests that the 
state's parens patriae power or its substitute parent role should be limited by 
a constitutional doctrine. 218 The Court's analysis of Moore is, of course, 
devoid of any discussion of the child's rights. But, under prevailing consti-
tutional analysis, the child was not even deemed to be a party to the liti-
gation. 
C. A Child's Constitutional Rights in the Adoption Process: 
A Reexamination of Drummond 
A unique feature of Drummond makes possible the development of 
constitutional analysis of the adoption process from the child's perspective. 
Drummond is one of the few cases in which foster parents have resorted to 
litigation, based on an alleged deprivation of their constitutional rights, 
when a state agency denied their request to adopt a particular child. 219 By 
217. Cf 431 U.S. at 50S n.16, 506; Zablocki v. Redhail, 454 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding 
invalid a Wisconsin statute prohibiting any person, having minor issue not in his custody which 
he is obligated to support, from marrying without a court order conditioned on a showing that 
the children are not likely to become public charges). 
218. Some commentators suggest that a constitutional theory of the state's role in family 
life requires us to answer the question, "Is the fetus a child?" See, e.g., R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, 
FAMILY, AND STATE 4 (1978) {hereinafter cited as MNOOKIN III]. The question, however, is 
a red herring in the context of this paper. A particular legal definition of a fetus' status is not 
necessary to a child-centered theory of adoption. To the degree that the proposed analysis fo-
cuses on a child's "wanted" status, the theory provides a less alarmist perspective on the effect 
on law of new biological and technological developments in human reproduction. Though 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at 115, states: "In the future, the development of artificial wombs 
and of reproduction by cloning may further blur the notion of biological parentage," it is my 
position that such developments will not blur the notion of the wanted child." 
219. See also Kyees v. County Department of Public Welfare, No. 76-1723, slip. op. (7th 
Cir. June 22, 1979). The Kyees court specifically adopted the reasoning of the Drummond II 
court and rejected the Kyees' claim that they had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
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asserting that their status as foster parents and prospective adoptive parents 
made them eligible for constitutional relief, the Drummonds put the opera-
tion of two distinct legislative processes-foster care and adoption-under 
judicial scrutiny. 
The distinctions among various child placement decisions serve primar-
ily the interests of adults in children. As noted above, the legislative design 
of foster care systems only incidentally accommodates a child's interests. 
Similarly, recent adoption reforms usually seek to protect the adults' inter-
ests in children rather than protect the child's interest. 220 Under these cir-
cumstances, when the legislative process does not clearly accommodate the 
child's interests, constitutional adjudication can legitimately be used to fo-
cus upon the interests of those who cannot be heard in the normal legisla-
tive and judicial process. 221 A court could legitimately seize upon the 
unique posture of the litigants in a case like Drummond to begin to develop 
a new theory of the child's rights. 
In the context of the Drummond case, all parties conceded that Timmy 
had an attachment to the Drummonds since they had met his needs practi-
cally from birth. The courts should have recognized that Timmy's emotional 
relationship with the Drummonds during his first two years was of funda-
mental significance regardless of how that relationship developed. From an 
emotional and psychological perspective the Drummonds were Timmy's 
family. This author's analysis of Moore supports characterizing Timmy's rela-
tionship as involving his rights. Drummond failed to mention the implica-
tions of Moore for the litigation, and the ensuing limited role for the state if 
Timmy's relationship to the Drummonds was recognized as a "family." 
Even though the agency may have structured Timmy's relationship with 
the Drummonds as that of a child temporarily entrusted to a foster family, 
the Drummonds' desire to adopt Timmy should have been sufficient for 
courts to see Timmy as a wanted child. 222 This perspective on Timmy's 
right to family is compelled even if we think the Drummonds may have ma-
nipulated the foster care system to adopt Timmy. 223 Giving full recognition 
to a child's constitutional right to a family may mean foregoing other goals 
such as encouraging proper adult behavior. 
their relationship with a foster child. However, the Kyees were not seeking judicial permission 
to adopt the child themselves (they had sought such relief in a prior action, but the court there 
declined co overrule the county authorities, and the Kyees did not appeal), but rather to pre-
serve their relationship with the child via a placement with another local family (the child had 
been removed from the Kyees' home and placed with a family in another stare). 
220. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN § 74.406, "Notice to putative father" (Supp. 1977), en-
acted subsequent to the Georgia Supreme Court Drummond decision. 
221. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Comtitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703-18, 
(1975). 
222. See GoLDSTEIN I, supra note 41, at 20-21. 
223. See note 16 supra. 
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1. The State Must ]ustt/y Disruption of a Child's Family 
in Terms of the Child's Present Needs. 
37 
Since the stability of Timmy's relationship with the Drummonds should 
have been viewed as a constitutionally-protected right, the state should have 
offered a compelling justification for disrupting his family. In addition, un-
der the above analysis of Moore, the agency's attempt as substitute parent to 
determine Timmy's interests should have been given less deference than 
the Drummonds' determination of Timmy's needs. 
In Drummond, however, the agency decided that Timmy's long term in-
terests would be met by denying the Drummonds' request to adopt him. 
The federal court deferred to the agency's judgment without discussing the 
implications of this deference from Timmy's viewpoint. The agency's judg-
ment, as noted above, was a prediction that Timmy would risk less harm 
in the future if he suffered the immediate harm of separation from the 
Drummonds. By acquiescing in the agency's prediction, the court placed 
the burden on Timmy's counsel and on the Drummonds to prove the pre-
diction incorrect. 
If the decision about adoption is to be concerned with the child's inter-
ests, then the constitutional inquiry should focus on the present needs of a 
child. 224 The shift in focus to Timmy's immediate needs is based on the 
premise that the role of law in shaping family life should be minimal. 225 In 
Drummond, when Timmy was only rwo, the focus of the inquiry should 
have been on his present need for a family. 
The effect of this perspective in Drummond would have been to require 
a demonstration of the agency's assertion about Timmy's long term needs. 
A prediction about an individual's future is hard to prove. But if the stabil-
ity of the child's family is a constitutional imperative, then the state should 
be put to that difficult proof. To concentrate on Timmy's need for stability 
as a rwo-year-old is to grant his family the autonomy to grow and cope with 
his changing needs with a minimum of state interference. The court's def-
erence to the agency's decision in Drummond allowed the state agency to di-
vorce Timmy from his family, the Drummonds, without any articulated or 
substantial justification in terms of his immediate needs. It was as if the 
state, through legislative and administrative decisionmaking, decided which 
children should be removed because of a state judgment that the family re-
lationship would not work out "in the long run."226 
The proposed perspective is limited to a general presumption against 
state interference with a child's family. If, for instance, the state could 
224. See GOLDSTEIN I, supra note 41, at 32-34. 
225. For a child, the focus should be on his present needs on the corollary assumption 
that law cannot direct the behavior of adults in his future life in a positive fashion. 
226. See, e.g., Mrs. Grape's analysis of Timmy's relationship with the Drummonds. 547 
F.2d at 839. 
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prove actual physical neglect of a child by an adult, be it a biological, foster, 
or adoptive parent, then state interference with the relationship would be 
justifiable. The presumption merely places the risk of uncertainty in child 
placement litigation on the state rather than on private individuals. 
2. State Ordered Changes in a Child's Family Must Seek 
the Least Detrimental Available Alternative for the Child. 
Before a state child welfare agency removes a child from its familial 
surroundings, courts should require the agency to demonstrate what the 
proposed alternative family situation is. Application of this requirement in 
Drummond would have authorized the courts to ask the agency: "What do 
you propose to do with Timmy?" Instead, the Court, using the existing 
analysis of child placement decisions did not question the agency's proposal 
of a hypothetical black adoptive family for Timmy. The proposed analysis 
would have required proof of the existence of an actual adoptive family and 
a comparison of that family to the Drummond family in terms of Timmy's 
needs. 
The purpose of requiring proof of the alternative family for the child is 
to encourage agencies to make decisions that are realistic from a child's per-
spective. For instance, it was easy for the caseworkers in Drummond to refer 
to professional literature as the basis for the prediction that Timmy would 
be better off in a black adoptive family. 227 However, there was strong evi-
dence that no such black adoptive family was available for Timmy in 
Atlanta. 228 If no such adoptive families were available, the agency's predic-
tion was simply a way of increasing Timmy's chances of being permanently 
assigned to the foster care system. In other words, if the realistic options 
for Timmy were adoption by the Drummonds, an older white couple, or 
foster care with an older black family with remote possibility of adoption, 
Timmy's constitutional right to family demanded the Drummonds' be al-
lowed to adopt. 229 Under this proposed analysis, the court should have de-
clared that the removal of Timmy from the Drummonds' home by the state 
without an actual demonstration that an available alternative family was the 
least detrimental alternative violated Timmy's "fundamental right." This 
227. See, e.g., Mrs. Grape's conc~rns about transracial adoptions, 547 F.2d at 837-38, and 
the concerns reflected in Judge Roney's dissent in the Drummond I decision, Id. at 860 n.4. 
228. See Mrs. Hames' testimony about potential adoptive homes for Timmy, or the lack 
of same, 547 F.2d at 848. See also Fulton County Newspaper, April, 1978: 
"Those who hope to adopt children should know that getting a white infant may take 
three years, but those who accept special needs children may wait only a couple of 
months. Black parents are especially needed, and currently, there are six boys under six years 
old available to them." [emphasis added} 
229. See text accompanying notes 233-35 infra. 
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analysis avoids the question of whether the Drummonds' rights were vio-
lated by a denial of their petition to adopt Timmy. 
By making Timmy's rights paramount, the courts could generate, but 
not necessarily answer, a fundamental question: Is it in Timmy's best inter-
ests today to be adopted by the Drummonds in light of his placement in a 
third home for the past two years? In other words, the court could ask, 
"Which adults, if any, constitute Timmy's family?" To expedite the proceed-
ings, the court should have given notice of the pending litigation to 
Timmy's then custodians and granted them intervenor status. 230 If those 
custodians had accepted the court's invitation, then the case would have 
centered on which of the two private parties ought to prevail in being 
granted the status of parent. 231 Furthermore, Timmy should have had full 
party status. To give meaning to this status, his counsel should have had ac-
cess to the agency files, and to the competing adults. 232 Despite the poten-
tial emotional trauma of such a suit for the adults, the child's rights are best 
delineated by litigation between private parties rather than by litigation be-
tween a private party and the state. 
Had the courts taken this approach, the court decision could have 
more effectively ended the litigation in Timmy's life. By making a realistic 
decision about Timmy's placement, several years after his removal from the 
Drummond home, the court could have avoided the pitfall of assuming that 
it could repair the damages that had occurred in Timmy's life. Despite the 
hardship to the Drummonds, they may not "win" Timmy. A proper consti-
tutional theory of child's rights would not award Timmy as damages for the 
adults' heartaches and misfortunes. 233 Using the proposed guidelines, a 
court could recognize that the new custodians are his "parents" despite the 
admitted unconstitutional disruption of his relationship to the Drummonds. 
In summary, the proposed theory of a child's constitutional right to 
family means three things. First, there is a presumption against state inter-
ference with any child-adult relationship in which the adult is meeting the 
child's daily needs for emotional nurture. Using this presumption, there is 
no constitutionally significant difference between the foster family, biolog-
ical family, adoptive family, or the extended family in Moore since the 
230. Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 
231. See GoLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at 100, describing the burden on the intervenor in 
an attempt to alter a child's current placement, under the authors" proposed Model Child 
Placement Statute. The Drummonds, in this case, would have to show both that Timmy is 
unwanted by his present custodians and that the child's current placement is not the least detri-
mental alternative. 
232. To make an independent judgement with reference to Timmy's interest, Timmy's 
counsel must have the right to seek out germane information by written and oral depositions 
of the competing parties, and the agency involved and the power to subpoena agency files. 
233. See Goldstein Why Foster Care-For Whom for How Long? 30 PSYCHOANALYTIC 
STUDY OF THE CHILD 647, 653 (1975). 
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presumption focuses our attention on a child's dependency upon particular 
adults. Second, any attempts by the state to disrupt the adult-child relation-
ship under the rubric of the child's "best interests" must be justified in 
terms of the child's immediate needs rather than his long term needs. This 
requirement would mean that the Drummond-type definition of the child's 
long range best interests was constitutionally inadequate to justify interfer-
ence with Timmy's relationship to the Drummonds. Third, any proposed 
change in the identity of the adults who meet a child's needs requires not 
only an articulated adequate justification, but also the presence of an actual 
alternative placement that constitutes the least detrimental alternative from 
the child's perspective. In practical terms, the third requirement of a child's 
rights means a court would invalidate any changes in a child placement such 
as those in Drummond where no actual adoptive or foster family was pro-
posed to replace the disrupted family. 
Taken together the requirements mean that the conflicts among adults 
with interests in a particular child must be resolved by courts rather than by 
the current practice of the agency standing in place of one of the competing 
adults. Further, in choosing between available adults, a court should make a 
choice, "on the basis of short-term predictions and given the limitations of 
knowledge," that maximizes the child's opportunity for being wanted and 
maintains a child's relationship with at least one psychological parent. 234 By 
seeking to maintain existing relationships, the proposed theory takes ac-
count of the child's sense of time, which is a crucial aspect of his constitu-
tional rights. 
Using this statement of the proposed theory, we can now answer the 
question posed earlier regarding the child's right to be adopted. 235 In light 
of the presumption against state interference with parent-child relationships, 
the right to be adopted would not allow the state to determine a priori, for 
instance, that Timmy's unwed mother was "unfit" because of Timmy's long 
range interest. Rather the child's right to be adopted is a relevant considera-
tion only when the child's biological parents indicate that they do not want 
the child by either voluntarily surrendering guardianship or by failing to 
meet the child's most basic emotional and physical needs. In the latter case, 
the state can disrupt the parent-child relationship, but its goal should be 
permanent placement as soon as possible. Thus, adoption is preferred to 
foster care placement because the adoptive parents are not only indicating 
that they want the child, but because adoption maximizes the child's oppor-
tunity to maintain the adult-child relationship. Foster placement has the op-
posite effect on the child's opportunity to maintain a relationship with an 
adult because it increases the child's chance of instability in his relationships 
to adults, even if in each relationship the child is wanted. 
234. GoLDSTEIN, Jupra note 41, at 53. 
235. See text at 46, Jupra. 
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When placement of a child is contested before a court, the court should 
transform the child placement hearing into a hearing on the child's adoption 
between all interested private parties and the child welfare agency. After 
examining those parties who want the child, the court should choose that 
adult who can best meet the child's needs. Thus, under the proposed theory 
of the child's right to family, his right to adoption depends upon the partic-
ular social circumstance of the child's life. 
In the context of Drummond, Timmy's right to adoption meant the 
Court of Appeals should have ordered his adoption in 1976. But giving rec-
ognition to the child's sense of time in 1978, the court should have allowed 
Timmy's present custodians to adopt him unless the Drummonds could 
demonstrate that Timmy was unwanted. If the Drummonds had succeeded 
in proving this, a court could have ordered Timmy's adoption by the 
Drummonds without agency inquiry as to whether the Drummonds were 
the "best parents" for Timmy out of the available pool of adoptive parents. 
Finally, in proposing that courts should recognize a child's right to fam-
ily and a specific right to adoption in a certain context, we should note two 
significant differences between the adult's and child's constitutional family 
rights. Courts should give some deference to legislative categories of family 
in their constitutional analysis when only adults' rights to family are at 
stake. Acceptance of the proposed theory does not imply, for instance, that 
two unmarried adults can force the state to treat their relationship as a 
"marriage."236 Justice Brennan's position in OFFER that foster family and 
biological families receive different constitutional protections should be 
limited to situations where only adults' rights are at issue. As noted above, 
from a child's perspective there is no constitutionally significant difference 
between the foster family, biological family, or adoptive family. This consti-
tutional analysis re~ognizes the dependency of children and their inability to 
choose their family in the sense that adults have freedom of choice in fam-
ily matters. Justice Powell's analysis in Moore supports a definition of a 
child's family in terms of dependency. 
Second, as a consequence of the child's being dependent on adults for 
having his needs met, the state's interference with the child's family re-
quires not only a compelling justification, but a realistic alternative means 
of meeting those emotional needs. Thus, in constitutional analysis of family 
law issues the Court can declare a statute regulating marriage and the eco-
nomic support of children unconstitutional by reference to the compelling 
state interests test. 237 If, however, the same case had actually involved chil-
dren as parties, the Court would have had to weigh the actual available 
alternatives for the children in terms of meeting the child's emotional 
236. See e.g., Jomes v. Hallahn, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973). 
23 7. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 3 74 (1978). 
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needs. Were the suit over child support actually resolved by reference to 
the child's interests, the definition of the child's needs by the private 
custodian-be he divorced parent, foster parent, biological parent or adop-
tive parent-must be preferred to the state's definition of the child's needs. 
The requirements of a realistic alternative placement in child placement liti-
gation is a means of limiting the state's role as substitute parent under the 
proposed constitutional analysis. 
The difference between the child's constitutional interests and an 
adult's interest in the family means that the proper subject matter of child 
placement litigation should be the child's rights. 238 The proposed theory 
implies that the rights of children within the family should also be para-
mount when parent-child conflicts come before courts. As a child's needs 
are met by different adults over time, the court must seek the least detri-
mental alternative for the child. The proposed theory would permit courts 
to recognize the legal significance of the child's dependency upon adults. In 
effect, this theory of the child's rights unites procedural and substantive due 
process analyses. In developing the doctrine of the woman's right to choice 
in family matters, the Court has had to rely on a combination of substantive 
and procedural analyses. 239 Similarly, in developing a theory of a child's con-
stitutional rights in family matters the Court would have to eschew the tra-
ditional boundaries of substantive and procedural due process. 240 
IV. A LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ADOPTION PROCESS 
Courts may be reluctant to use the constitutional analysis proposed in 
this article for a number of reasons. First, the proposed analysis suggests 
that adoption disputes ought to be decided by reference to the child's "sub-
stantive due process" rights at a time when the United States Supreme 
Court appears extremely reluctant to re-open the doctrinal debate over sub-
stantive due process. 241 Second, by arguing that courts should ignore the 
legislative distinctions between various child welfare systems such as foster 
care and adoption, the proposed analysis implicitly poses questions about 
the appropriateness of present child welfare legislative policies. 242 Some 
238. See GoLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at 7. 
239. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1972). 
240. Some commentators have supported such a departure from a strict textual interpre-
ta~ion of the Constitution as a method of judicial analysis. See, e.g., Grey, note 223, supra and 
Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism; Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.]. 399 (1978). 
241. The Court's most recent use of a "substantive due process" type analysis in the 
abortion cases generated vigorous criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Ely The Wages of Cry-
ing Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.). 920 (1973). These criticisms reflect a con-
cern among constitutional law scholars about the state of theoretical development in the field 
generally. See, e.g., Grey, Origins of the Unwrillen Constitution: Fundamental Law in American 
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to 
Harvard, 13 HARV. C!V. RIGHTS L. REv. 117 (1978). 
242. For instance, the analysis in this article implicitly critiques the foster care system. A 
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courts may not see their constitutional role as encompassing the ability to 
raise such policy issues. Finally, because the proposed analysis has argued 
against present constitutional analyses as adult centered, courts may be re-
luctant to radically alter the idea of vested parental rights that now domi-
nates legal decisions involving a child's adoption. 
This article has argued that all of these objections have a common ori-
gin: the assumption that the state is competent to act as a substitute parent. 
Once this overall assumption is rejected by courts, the arguments against 
the proposed constitutional analysis should not be persuasive. If courts re-
ject this assumption, the analysis urges them to develop a new perspective 
on legal disputes involving adoptions that would require the prevailing con-
stitutional analyses to be reexamined from the child's perspective. 
Even if courts reject the constitutional analysis offered in this article it 
nevertheless provides guidelines for reforming the child placement laws. It 
accomplishes this by asking legislatures and child welfare agencies to devise 
a new overall perspective on child placement laws that would determine 
whether the state should continue to act as substitute parent. 243 The an-
swer under the proposed constitutional analysis is "No." 
A legislature might view the Drummond analysis and result as demon-
strating the need for reform of the laws governing adoption. If, using the 
Drummond analysis the legislature defined the problem as being one of in-
terracial adoption, resolution of the competing interests would be even 
more difficult because of the overabundance of black infants (and other 
so-called "hard to place" children) compared to the scarcity of white infants 
available for adoption. 244 If interracial adoption is viewed as the issue, the 
court might be reluctant to use the analysis just because it implies the need for radical revision 
of the foster care system. If courts had an overall perspective on the role of Jaw in a child's 
life, however, these implicit criticisms of the foster care system would not be seen as a barrier 
to using the analysis in a controversy over adoption. The analysis proposed here is consistent 
with the idea that legislature's ought to revise the foster care system. See Goldstein, Why Foster 
Care-For Whom For How Long, 30 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 647 (1975). 
243. Cf GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41, Chapter 7, '"Provisions for a Model Child Place-
ment Statute.'" 
244. See Shyne, Adoption Trends: 1976, 56 CHILD WELFARE 479 (1977); Haring, Adop-
tion Trends: 1971-1975, 55 CHILD WELFARE 501 (1976); Haring, Adoption Trends; 1971-1974, 
54 CHILD WELFARE 524 (1975). See a/so SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 11 
(1977), and GROW & SHAPIRO, BLACK CHILDREN, WHITE PARENTS: A STUDY OF TRANS-
RACIAL ADOPTION 3 (1974). 
The Child Welfare League of America Research Center reports that non-white homes for 
non-white children continue to be in short supply: 74 non-white homes approved per 100 non-
white children accepted for placement in voluntary agencies, and 67 non-white homes ap-
proved per 100 non-white children accepted in public agencies. Shyne, supra, at 480. This re-
port, however, was derived from a data base of only 15 public and 40 voluntary child welfare 
agencies. Also, the data does not statistically separate the non-white infant from the group of 
non-white children. 
White parents willing to adopt a black or minority child are assumed to be entering a spe-
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legislature would have to address this market situation. In attempting to de-
vise a solution, the legislature should use the growing body of social science 
literature on interracial adoption. 245 But, before such research material 
could be used as a basis for reformulating legislative policies, the legislators 
would need a perspective which would allow them to understand and de-
bate the merits of adopting and implementing the goals which are implicit 
in this body of literature. With such a perspective, legisJators would be 
equipped to explicitly identify and debate the goals of those who have stud-
ied interracial adoption. Therefore, they would be confronted with the issue 
of the role law ought to play in a child's life. 
The studies by social scientists of interracial adoption have led to the 
development of two predominant approaches to this problem. First, some 
commentators suggest that policy makers ought to be primarily concerned 
with the social consequences that a child in an interracial adoption might 
experience, particularly in adolescence. 246 Some of the literature, for in-
stance, supports the agency view in Drummond, that in the long run Timmy, 
cial or different adoption market. Assumptions vary, however, with each group involved in the 
market. For critics of transracial adoption, it is a market where white adults, responding to the 
scarcity of white children seek the black children whom black adults would adopt were they 
(1) aware of the children's availability or (2) economically capable of supporting another child. 
Cf Position Paper, National Association of Black Social Worker's Conference, in Nashville, Tenn., 
April 4-9, 1972, reprinted in SIMON, supra at 50. To white adoptive parents, a child's "hard to 
place" status because of race may be an added factor in their desire to adopt him. GROW, su-
pra, at 70, reports that 42% of the white parents in their srudy who had adopted transracially 
gave as their reason the social motivation of providing a home for a 'hard to place' child. An-
other 10% saw transracial adoption as a way of "furthering the cause of integration or a way of 
carrying out their Christian duty." For an analysis of the child adoption market from a more 
purely economic perspective, see Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 ). LE-
GAL STUD. 323 (1978). ,' 
A final factor to consider here is the consequence of an "economic" response to the short-
age of non-white families for non-white adoptive children. Subsidized adoption, for example, 
would impose upon the family not only the economic cost of an additional family member, but 
also the burden of continuing state intervention into family life. 
245. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 244; ). LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES, 216-217 (1977); 
and BILLINGSLY & GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN & THE STORM, 197-199 (1972). 
246. See LADNER, supra note 247 at 49, 79-81 and 252-254. Cf COMER & POUSSAINT, 
BLACK CHILD CARE 19-20 (1975): 
In the past, black children were taught the rituals of servitude and docility from the 
time they could talk. These included addressing all whites, adults and children alike, 
with a "yes sir" or "no sir". In turn they were called names like "tar baby" or "Little 
Black Sambo" and otherwise cruelly mocked and tormented by whites. Today the 
black child is still made to feel inferior to whites. From his earliest days he senses that 
his life is viewed cheaply by white society and that he enjoys little protection at its 
hands. For example, black youths are frequently the victims of racially motivated po-
lice abuse at an early age .... The black child has been forced to learn to live in two 
culrures--his own minority culture and the majority one. He has had to teach himself 
to contain his aggression around whites while freely expressing it among blacks. Some 
people call this a survival technique. 
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the mixed-race child, will be better off with a black family than with a white 
family such as the Drummonds. A second group of commentators emphasize 
that the criteria used to deny prospective parents access to the adoption 
process irrespective of the race of any child involved ought to be revised. 
Scholars analyzing the interracial adoption issue from this perspective point 
to the economic and social standards imposed on adoptive parents, and to 
their discriminatory effect of excluding black parents who might adopt 
black children. 247 Under these two approaches, the policy objectives be-
come, respectively, ensuring the racial identity of adoptive parent and child, 
and eliminating the selection criteria for adoptive parents that are facially 
neutral but discriminatory in effect. 
Under the proposed analysis, neither of the implicit goals of the com-
mentators on interracial adoption should be used by legislatures in re-
forming adoption laws because these goals are adult-centered goals. If, in-
stead, the legislature used the goal of this proposed analysis, i.e., the maxi-
mization of the chiid's opportunity to be wanted and nurtured by at least 
one adult as a basis for reform, the commentators' goals would be viewed as 
adult-centered and rejected on that basis. 
For example, those commentators whose concerns are with the effects 
of discriminatory standards for adoptive parents have recommended that 
the legislature enact subsidized adoption programs for "the hard to place 
child. "24 R While these commentators readily include all black or interracial 
children within the hard to place categories, 249 the proposed analysis re-
quires legislatures to be more refined in their own analysis. Given the scar-
city of white infants available for adoption, the legislature should try to re-
verse present agency policies that discourage adoption of black infants by 
white parents. 250 With this perspective, healthy infants of whatever race 
would not be classified as "hard to place." The new "hard to place" category 
would include those older and disabled children who are presently trapped 
in the foster care system. 251 The goals of a subsidized adoption program would 
then be much more specific and limited in terms of the child's needs 
247. See generally LADNER, supra note 245 at 221-224, 242; BILLINGSLEY, JUpra note 
245 at 188-197; SIMON, supra note 245 at 199-201; BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION 
144-156 (1976); S. KATZ, Subsidized Adoption in America, lO FAM. L. Q. 3 (1976). 
248. Cf SIMON, supra note 245 at 199-201; LADNER, supra note 245, at 242; KATz, 
note 247 supra. 
249. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 247 at 8, and the Model State Subsidized Adoption Act 
and Regulations. § 2, Comment 6, quoted in KATz at 11-12. 
250. There is political pressure which discourages such a policy reversal. See, e.g., Position 
Paper, National Association of Black Social Worker's Conference, supra note 244. But see Black 
Child, White Parents, New York Times, August 6, 1979, at 16, col. I. 
251. C/. Mnookin II, supra note 42, at 610-13; LADNER, supra note 245 at 215-216; 
Katz, supra note 248. Cf Goldstein, supra note 242, at 657 (a proposal for redefining foster 
care in terms of a child's needs for continuity of relationships). 
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rather than the larger goal of providing all adults equal access to the adop-
tion process. The more limited goal for subsidized adoption is based on the 
premise that it is preferable for a child to live in a family without state in-
tervention and supervision that is inherent in subsidized adoption. This 
view, of course, means that economically advantaged adults will have more 
opportunities to adopt than will less well-off adults. But this disparity 
should in turn be viewed as a misfortune of our society that today's chil-
dren should not be obligated to cure. 
Similarly, the goal of avoiding the social harm of being a member of an 
interracial family at adolescence should not be a goal of legislative reform 
for several reasons. The period of adolescence is a particularly difficult pe-
riod for both youth and parents in this society. Conflict between parents 
and youth is the norm rather than the exception. 252 Law should not single 
out the conflict over interracial dating or the problem of positive racial 
identity formation for the adoptive child as controlling in the adoptive proc-
ess as some commentators suggest. Implicit in the commentators' recom-
mendation is the idea that social aspects of childhood ought to be con-
trolling in the distribution of "parenthood rights."253 In addition, the goal 
of protecting the child from some future imagined social censure ignores 
the parents' capacity to grow to meet the child's needs. In rejecting the idea 
that the adoption process should find the perfect parent for the child, the 
legislature would only be recognizing the law's incapacity to remedy a crisis 
in the child's life at the time of adoption. In focusing on the present needs 
of a child, legislatures would be offering the best protection against social 
harm that law can provide an individual. 
Thus, the fundamental problem before the legislature is to implement 
the idea that the function of law is to protect a child from greater harm 
only at the point at which a crisis in a child's life comes to the attention of 
law. Under this view, the primary function of law is to provide a framework 
for resolving conflicts over children rather than planning their future lives. 
To protect the legal rights of children, these conflicts must always be adju-
dicated in terms of results to the child. Had Timmy's life in law begun un-
der a legislative system built on these principles, there could have been no 
252. Cf Burt, Jupra note 9, at 132-135. 
253. But m CALABRESI & BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 73 (1978). 
"(l}f the right to bear and care for children were made dependent on 'a showing of 
good moral character and the completion of a satisfactory essay discussion on the role 
of the superego in child development', both being arguably relevant to parenthood, 
we would object, on egalitarian grounds as soon as it became apparent that moral 
character and essay writing reflected traits that tended to be paired with particular 
socioeconomic groups." 
If we are to speak of these rights at all, the criteria for establishing them should be based on 
the care and nurturance of a child; a right emerging from that relationship, rather than an in-
trinsic right of all adults. · 
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adjudication of Timmy's biological mother's "unfitness" without reference 
to Timmy's actual disposition even if, under the circumstances, institutional 
placement was the least detrimental alternative.254 
Under the analysis proposed, Timmy's initial break with his biological 
parent would have been viewed as a crisis at one month of age. Rather than 
seek to find him a better parent, by adult standards, the goal of law should 
have been to recognize that the meeting of his needs was his "right." Thus 
the legislature should grant courts authority to meet the child's needs or to 
remedy the derogation of his rights. In Timmy's mother's situation the leg-
islature should limit the court's options to: (1) an immediate return of 
Timmy to his biological mother with the offer of services or (2) immediate 
termination of her parental rights and placing Timmy immediately for adop-
tion. But an indefinite sentence to foster care should not have been an 
option for the agency or courts. Once Timmy had remained with the 
Drummonds for two years, whether because of bureaucratic oversight or 
neglect, or their own manipulation of the foster care system, 255 the legisla-
ture should have viewed him as presumptively adopted. The agency would 
then have been interfering with Timmy's rights when he was removed. 
Contrary to present agency practices that discourage foster parent adop-
tions, there should be a legislative presumption in favor of adoption by fos-
ter care parents. 256 Such a presumption would force legislatures to review 
the hodge-podge of adoption laws to determine whether they impede a 
child's adoption. For instance, what purpose is served by adoption abroga-
tion?257 Legislation requiring the recognition of religious matching prefer-
ences "whenever practicable"25 R and the sealing of adoption records might 
be viewed with a new perspective. 259 As to the religious matching statutes, 
the legislature might ask whether they actually allow for the rapid adoption 
of children. 260 As to the unsealing of adoption records, the legislature must 
254. Cf GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41, at 53-64. 
255. See note 16 supra. 
256. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw§ 392(7) c & d (McKinney Supp. 1978); Datz, supra 
note 248, at 13-14; Goldstein, supra note 242, at 657-662. 
2 57. Adoption abrogation statutes allow, for example, an adoptive parent to petition a 
court to annul an adoption where the child turns out to have a developmental disability not 
disclosed or apparent at the time of adoption. See, e.g., CAL. Clv. CODE § 227b (West Supp. 
1978), and Department of Social Welfare v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 1, 459 P.2d 897, 81 
Cal. Rpt. 345 (1969). Many states have repealed their adoption abrogation statutes, see, e.g., 
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw§ 118b (McKinney 1977) (repeal effective June 15, 1974, 1974 N.Y. 
LAw, c. 1035 § 1) but the waiting period between placement and a final order of adoption, see, 
e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 112 (6) (McKinney 1977), gives the adoptive parents a chance to 
abrogate without explicit statutory provision. 
258. See, supra note 136. 
259. Cf SOROSKY, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE (1978), and Yesterday·s Child v. 
Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3777 (1978). 
260. See BENET, supra note 247, at 208-209; Note, Religious Matching Statutes and Adop-
tion, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 262 (1976). 
48 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11: 1 
distinguish the interests of the children and adults involved in this growing 
controversy. If legislatures were to reverse present policies and allow the 
adoption records to be unsealed at the request of an adult adoptee, an addi-
tional issue must be faced: what effect would such legislation have on the 
adoption of today's children which typically involves an unwed mother re-
linquishing a child for adoption? Neither of these current issues of legisla-
tive reform should be resolved without an overall perspective on child 
placement. 
The presumption against state interference with the child's family rela-
tionship argues for legislative recognition of all existing child-adult relation-
ships, where the child's needs are being met as the child's family regardless 
of their present legal labels. With such recognition, courts would have 
viewed all of the processes of law that intervened in Timmy's life as state 
interference with his family relationships. Were the other two aspects of the 
proposed constitutional analysis also used, courts would have required the 
agency to justify interference with his family by demonstrating that the 
alternative was the least detrimental from the child's perspective. 
In practical terms, this would require legislatures to review the actual 
operations of our systems of foster care, neglect and abuse, and adoption, 
and the case law supporting these various systems. Even though the record 
of these agencies may not be "ideal," 261 the legislature need not fault the 
agencies. The agencies' performance may in fact be indicative of law's true 
incapacity to perform the role of substitute parent. 262 
V. CONCLUSION 
Part I has demonstrated that a focus on parental rights in children al-
lows legal decision makers to ignore the effect of legal decisions upon the 
lives of children. Part II demonstrated that the existing method of constitu-
tional adjudication of adoption merely sanctions agency discretion. The 
alternative method offered in Part III is a constitutional theory that defines 
the child's legal rights in terms of a child's right to family and the actual 
consequences to the child of legal decisions. Part IV has suggested that ju-
dicial development of a theory of a child's constitutional rights should en-
courage legislatures and courts to reform the complex legal framework that 
presently governs child placement. 
The analysis of Drummond presented here does not necessarily offer a 
complete constitutional theory to deal with "race."263 Rather, a constitu-
tional theory of a child's legal rights has been suggested as a better way of 
addressing the issues presented by the case. Recognizing a child's legal 
entitlement to a family means that his relationship to adults meeting his 
261. See LADNER, supra note 245, at 216-221; BENET, supra note 247, at 200-212. 
262. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 41; BURT, supra note 9. 
263. See note 94 supra. 
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needs must receive a maximum of constitutional protection from state in-
trusion alleged to be in his "best interest." More importantly, the recogni-
tion of a child's legal entitlement to family may mean in a conflict situation 
that adults have no entitlements in the child. In raising the child's en-
titlement to family to the highest level, the proposed constitutional doc-
trine gives the highest protection to those adults who nurture and care for 
children. 
